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Damn, damn, damn, the Insurrectos
!
Cross-eyed ka-ki-ack ladrones !
Underneath the starry flag,
Civilize 'em with a Krag,
And return us to our own beloved homes.
"The Soldiers' Song"
INTRODUCTION
Private Willie Grayson of the First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry
gazed uneasily into the tropical darkness. Had he really seen movement
or was it just his imagination? Grayson had reason to be apprehensive.
He and two other men from his company had been ordered to patrol the small
village of Santol, located on the eastern outskirts of Manila; part of the
American outpost system. The young volunteer was over seven thousand miles
from the familiar prairie of home, soldiering in a strange land combining
the mysteries of the ancient orient and the equally incomprehensible tradi-
tions of Spain.
The Filipinos themselves were an enigma to Grayson and the other
American soldiers. Many were friendly but others were sullen and antago-
nistic. Since the arrival of the First Nebraska Volunteers in July 189 8
and the surrender of Spanish forces throughout the archipelago, the relations
between the U.S. Army and General Aguinaldos ' Filipino insurgents had
deteriorated. The natives had just rid themselves of one group of colonial
masters, and with the increased arrival of more American soldiers during the
summer it was evident that the United States planned a prolonged stay in the
Philippine Islands. In fact, an agreement would be reached between the U.S.
and Spain as a result of the Treaty of Paris, ceding the islands to the
Americans for the payment of $20 million to Spain. Of course, affairs of
state were not the concern of the Nebraskan nor was he probably interested
in the machinations of statesmen. What was of concern were the constant
insinuations of cowardice hurled at the Americans by the insurgents coupled
with their menacing behavior. The insurgents, now calling themselves the
Philippine Army, had dug sixteen miles of trench line, manning it with
30,000 armed Filipinos, facing the 14,000 Americans occupying the Manila
2defense perimeter. Emilio Aguinaldo, the principal leader of the islanders,
had proclaimed Philippine independence on 12 June, established a provisional
government on 23 June and set up his capital at Malolos, north of Manila
3
on 8 September. In addition, but unknown to most Americans, Aguinaldo had
also issued secret instructions on 9 January to the Manila Sandatahan , a
sort of citizen's militia, of what was expected of them in a possible forth
-
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coming anti-American uprising. The stage was set.
It was about 8:30 p.m. and Private Grayson was now certain he saw
four armed Filipinos. Firmly gripping his Springfield rifle he challenged
the approaching figures. After he called out halt a second time, he heard
the distinct metallic sound of a rifle being cocked. The American brought
his rifle to his shoulder and pulled the trigger, dropping the leading
insurrecto in a cloud of black -powder smoke. The date was 4 February 1899
and the first shot was fired marking the commencement of what was to be
called the Philippine Insurrection or the Philippine-American War as it is
known in the Philippine Islands. Admiral Dewey was later to say in his
autobiography:
The growing anger of the natives had broken
into flame. Now, after paying twenty million
for the islands, we must establish our
authority by force against the very wishes of
the people whom we sought to benefit.
6
Now that McKinley's administration found itself with a war on its
hands, the President realized that action would be required to provide an
army to fight it. Although Major General E. S. Otis commanded over 15,000
troops in the Philippines, the bulk of his force consisted of the nine
infantry regiments and three artillery batteries of state volunteers raised
for service during the Spanish -American War and scheduled for muster-out
7during the autumn of 1899. The departure of the state volunteers would
leave the U.S. commander with an army of 3 regular infantry regiments, 6
regular cavalry troops, and 6 regular artillery batteries, much less than
the 30,000 men the overly optimistic Otis had estimated as a minimum force
g
to subdue the insurgency. With this situation in mind President McKinley
received authority from Congress, in an act approved 2 March 1899, to
increase the size of the Regular Army to 65,000 men, primarily by increasing
the number of enlisted men in each infantry company from one hundred twelve
to one hundred twenty eight, and to organize twenty-four regiments of
g
volunteer infantry, and one regiment of volunteer cavalry. By the end of
the Philippine Insurrection in 1902, 126,468 American soldiers would have
served in the Philippine Islands, and the maximum strength at any one time
would reach over 74,000 officers and men. A point of particular signifi-
cance is that one hundred per cent of the men in this army, designated the
Eighth Corps, would be volunteers.
The Philippine Insurrection was to be the last major armed conflict
in which the U.S. would participate with a force made up entirely of volun-
teers. The volunteer was promised no bonus, no war risk insurance, no
vocational training and no hospitalization until 1922. And yet the army
had little problem filling the ranks of its Philippine army. This is all
the more surprising taken in the context of the period and the kind of war
to be fought. The U.S. had just concluded a peace with Spain following the
war of 1898, which ended in a storm of accusations of scandal in high
office over the conduct of that war. As early as January 1899 a variegated
group known as the An ti -Imperialists called for neutralization of the
12
Philippines and began to work for removal of U.S. presence there. The
war itself was of the most unpleasant sort. Beginning as a war of sizeable
regular military units, by 12 November 1899 Aguinaldo ordered his forces to
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undertake a guerrilla war. It was an infantryman's war of steaming jungle
trails and fierce agile bolomen. The American superiority in fire power
meant little in the rugged country of rain forest and muddy trails and the
conflict degenerated into a condition of man versus man, where bravery and
quick thinking meant everything. When the soldiers were not fighting, they
were faced with the tasks of nation building. Establishment of schools
and municipal governments, reestablishment of commerce, providing health
services and enforcing municipal sanitation measures became tasks of the
soldiers which were as important as battling the insurgents. Within sixty-
five years the U.S. would again find itself engaged in a war which bore
much more than just a cosmetic resemblance to the Philippine Insurrection.
The commencement of America's direct involvement in this later war
was marked by the creation of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(USMACV) on 9 February 1962. The conflict was primarily a guerrilla war
and continued until April 1975. It involved an American Army manned, in
large part, by conscripts. For a number of reasons the army reverted to a
volunteer force following its most intensive period of participation in the
Vietnam War. Prior to the advent of the All-Volunteer Army, with the end
of the draft on 1 July 1973, many of the non-commissioned and junior
officers showed a great deal of skepticism as to its ability to accomplish
its missions. Many of the volunteers who had enlisted and served in Vietnam
proved a disgrace to the army and the nation. Officers and NCOs who led at
the small unit level usually found the draftee to be the better soldier
both in combat and back at base camp. Those individuals involved with the
administration of military justice during this period quickly discovered
that court martial proceedings involved enlistees more often than conscripts.
The reasons for this phenomenon during the war in Southeast Asia will not
be discussed as they are not particularly pertinent to this paper. However,
the military capabilities of the volunteer soldier are relevant to the
subject under study.
In light of the army's current posture, a look at the U.S. Army's
last war in an all-volunteer status is in order. As one considers the
accomplishments of America's Philippine fighting force, he must keep in mind
that the social environment and system of values in the United States has
undergone many changes in the past seventy or so years. This paper will
view the experiences of a company of U.S. Volunteers in order to ascertain,
through its record, what a volunteer unit is capable of accomplishing. The
unit selected as the vehicle for this investigation is Company H, Forty-third
Regiment of Infantry, U.S. Volunteers. The regiment was organized under
provisions of General Order Number 150, Headquarters of the Army, dated
17 August 1899. The choice of this particular unit was made based on
several facts. The primary reason was personal, as the author's maternal
grandfather served as the second lieutenant of the company. The few letters
left behind by this relative represent a second consideration, as they add
to the record a color which is virtually impossible to gain from studying
official documents alone. The 43d Regiment was made up of men recruited
mainly in the north-eastern quarter of the U.S., with the exception of
Companies L and M which were organized in California. This provides a broad
spectrum of backgrounds. Soldiers of Company H were recruited from Water-
ville, Maine, Paducah, Kentucky, and Leavenworth, Kansas as well as other
towns and cities in between. And finally, the company's parent regiment
served on the islands of Samar and Leyte until July 1900, and then just on
Leyte, acting as the supreme American authority over the inhabitants without
any significant interference from higher headquarters on Panay to contami-
nate the effects of the Regiment's civil and military activities.
PART I
The Forty-third Organizes at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont
Complying with his orders from Army Headquarters in Washington,
Colonel Arthur Murray, U.S.V. arrived at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, a
recently built post located north of Burlington, at 9 p.m. on 24 August
1899. The white-bearded Murray, by being assigned as commander of the
newly designated Forty-third Regiment of Infantry, U.S. Volunteers rose
from an artillery captain of regular army to colonel of U.S. Volunteers,
bringing with it a large increase in prestige and pay and allowances.
Graduating second in his West Point class in 1874, he must have looked upon
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this long awaited opportunity with excitement bordering on delirium. At
this point, however, the colonel was a commander without a command. Soon
newly assigned officers would begin arriving, mostly former state volunteer
officers with the exception of his three West Point educated majors, but
still the unit lacked troops. His orders authorized him to direct his newly
arriving lieutenants to regular army recruiting stations for recruiting
1
8
duties. For the next two or three months the greater portion of his
officers would involve themselves with the feverish search for suitable men
to fill the Regiment's ranks. The Forty- third found itself competing with
two other regiments in the quest for material to be transformed into
19
soldiers. Recruiting would continue into mid-October before the 43d
would be considered up to strength by Army Headquarters.
Harry M. Dey of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania reported for recruiting
duty at Camden, New Jersey after learning of his appointment as a first
lieutenant assigned to the 43d Volunteers on 26 August 1899. After a period
of recruiting in New Jersey and command of various provisional companies at
Fort Lthan Allen he assumed command, on 8 October 1899, of Company H. His
two lieutenants, also assigned on that date, were 1st Lieutenant Frank
Gordon, a forty-one year old Washington, D.C. lawyer and 2d Lieutenant
William Henry Wilson, a twenty-two year old bank clerk, bringing with him
an excellent record as an enlisted man in the 22d New York Infantry Regiment
20
of Volunteers and a burning desire for a career in the U.S. Army. Gordon
would be discharged in November 1899 for reasons of health, being succeeded
by 1st Lieutenant Joseph F. Sweeney from Newport, Rhode Island.
Prior to his assignment to the company, Sweeney performed recruiting
duties in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Joining the Regiment on 3 October
as a 2d Lieutenant, he was promoted to 1st Lieutenant by the end of the same
*i 21month.
Of 2d Lieutenant Wilson's experiences before assignment to Company H,
we have more information which gives some idea of the officer's experience
as a recruiter. Wilson received his telegram dated 26 August, notifying him
of his 2d Lieutenant's appointment and further ordering him to the New York
City recruiting station for duty. For about two weeks he worked in the
Yonkers sub-station after which he reported for duty at Fort Ethan Allen.
No sooner had the young lieutenant arrived than he was ordered back on
recruiting service, this time for the Regiment. On Thursday afternoon
14 September he opened an office in the second floor of the Allen Building,
22
overlooking Water Street in Augusta, Maine. This slim, mustachioed young
officer wearing the high collared blue uniform with the white infantry trim,
as he moved about this Kennebec River town, posting recruiting notices in
conspicuous places, must have been an impressive sight to the local
citizenry.
All men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, of good
character and habits, able-bodied, free from disease, and capable of
23
speaking English were invited to join the 43d. Wilson contracted with
Doctor G. H. Brickett, a civilian physician in the area, to perform the
medical examinations required by army regulation. Between the opening of
the enlistment office and its closing on 2 October, the lieutenant received
eighty- three applicants. Of this number only twenty- three passed the
physical. Eight of those accepted were destined for the 39th Volunteers
regimental band at Fort Wayne, Indiana and one was rejected by the Adjutant
General's office in Washington when records showed he had received a
discharge "without honor" from the U.S. arsenal at Augusta. Another fifty-
six were refused enlistment without a physical.
Some were married, others were over 32 years
of age, others under 21, and without the
consent of their parents, still others were
bums and not wanted. 24
The preceding indicates the discretion used by Lieutenant Wilson in his
selection and can be attributed to his personal code of duty and, of course,
in some measure to the realization that some of these recruits could well
be assigned to his company upon his return to Fort Ethan Allen. The new
soldiers were sworn in by the recruiting officer administering the oath:
All and each of you do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that you will bear true faith and
allegiance to the United States of America,
that you will serve them honestly and
faithfully against all their enemies whom-
soever, and that you will obey the orders
of the President of the United States, and
the orders of the officers appointed over
you, according to the Rules and articles
of War. 25
They were now soldiers of the Forty-third Infantry Regiment of U.S.
10
Volunteers. At 6:30 in the morning of 3 October with his fourteen charges
safely loaded aboard the train, 2d Lieutenant William Henry Wilson departed
Augusta for the Regiment's post in the shadows of Vermont's Green Moun-
.
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tains.
On 8 October 1899 Company H was activated under provisions of
General Order No. 18 with Captain Harry M. Dey as commander. Sergeant
Joseph B. Graham, a six foot tall ex-salesman born in County Down, Ireland
twenty-nine years before, became the company first sergeant two days later.
The next most senior NCO, also appointed on Company Order No. 1, was
Quartermaster Sergeant John W. Ward. By 4 November 1899 the unit contained
four sergeants, twelve corporals, two cooks and eighty six privates in
27
addition to the three officers and two senior noncoms.
The soldiers of Company H transferred from the large brick barracks
built in 1895 to Sibly tents which had been set up in rows. The tents were
used in lieu of the barrack buildings for two reasons. The first was space,
Fort Ethan Allen had been designed to accommodate a squadron of cavalry,
about 500 troops, not a 1,000 or more man infantry regiment. The second
was based on Colonel Murray's discovery that the constant cold winds for
which the post was renowned created a heating imbalance inside the barracks
so that one side was frigid while the other would be intolerably hot. The
wooden-floored conical shaped tents, on the other hand, were kept livable
2 8
with heat evenly distributed by the stove mounted in the center.
With the company formed, training became the primary mission. The
raw material had to be transformed into warriors, and the time was short.
Back on 7 September the regimental commander had determined the training
day with the publication of his "List of Calls" his headquarter' s second
11
29published General Order. A letter from Lieutenant Wilson to his mother
on 22 October indicates that the regiment still kept closely to this time-
table. Since Lieutenant Gordon was assigned as range officer and, therefore,
excused from drill, the company's second lieutenant attended to the troops
during most of the drill periods. Because basic courses for officers had
not yet been founded by the American army, the Regiment's officers attended
an evening officers' school, established by order of the Regiment's
commander, in an effort to learn their trade. Since all officers were
required to have volunteer service as an officer, or in some cases, as a
noncommissioned officer before appointment, most basics were probably fairly
well ingrained by this time. Wilson's letter of 22 October mentions the
study of tactics, probably based on Emory Upton's United States Army
Infantry Tactics , which would prove more suited to battle on the open plains
than in the guerrilla war in the Philippine jungle. The junior officers
were also burdened with the age-old tasks of officer of the guard, recorders
of boards of survey, participation on various boards of officers, and
completing a multitude of army paper-work chores. The typical duty day ran
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from 5:45 a.m. to 11 or 12 p.m. for the company officers.
The men of the company were also busy. Rumors of up-coming deploy-
ment dates for the voyage to the Far East were continually going the rounds.
This stimulated a genuine sense of urgency within the unit resulting in full
training days for the soldiers. On the rifle range each man was required
31
to fire at targets from 100 to 600 yards distant with the issue Krag rifle.
In late October Company H recruits were put through the prescribed rifle
qualification course. By the end of the range period each man and company
officer was required by Army Regulations to have fired 110 rounds in the
12
preliminary and record stages. Both prior to and following live fire the
men cleaned their weapons using rags saturated with soda water, when
32
available, or plain water.
A few comments about the Krag rifle are appropriate here as it was
the primary tool of the U.S. soldier of this period. The Krag-Jorgensen
rifle, officially designated the United States Magazine Rifle, caliber .30,
was a modification of a weapon originally designed by two Norwegians,
Captain Ole U. J. Krag and Erik Jorgensen. Adopted by the War Department
in 1893, it was the army's first bolt action service rifle. By 1899 two
primary models were being issued, the models 1896 and 1898, both produced
by the Springfield armory. Although made there it was not called a Spring-
field as that term referred to the single shot .45-70 Springfield models
1873-1889 which were still in service in some state units in spite of their
obsolescence. The Krag-Jorgensen is a handsome, business-like appearing
rifle with probably one of the smoothest bolt actions ever designed. It
weighs about ten pounds with a fixed bayonet and a full five round magazine,
It had a combat proven maximum effective range of over 1,000 yards, but
because of the low velocity of its bullet it caused concern when fired at
33
a moving target.
To present a balanced picture of the blue-clad infantryman at Fort
Ethan Allen, however, one must realize it was not all school of the
soldiers, instruction in outpost duty, skirmish drill at double time and
live fire practice at the rifle range. There were, of course, the routine
police details, the grinding, wearisome lot of the soldier. And on 22
October the men spent Sunday being measured for their khaki uniforms and
34pith helmets in anticipation of tropical service.
13
Soldiers also took part in the delights of off-duty activities. As
early as 25 September Colonel Murray found himself sending an apologetic
letter to the Municipal Board of the Village of Essex Junction, Vermont
regarding the "depredations" committed by troops of the command among the
35
citizens 1 fruit trees. There was always the five cent electric tram ride
into Burlington, Vermont for those men desiring a night in the big city and
with enough money to realize that pleasure. The deluge of blue coats really
struck that city after the 9 November payday, during which period the troops
wanted to make up for all the good times they would probably be missing
while serving in the Philippine Islands. After the night of 13 November
there were so many drunken soldiers apprehended that Major Gilmore had to
contact the chief of police and ask him to "grind them out and then let me
know and I will come down and pay up." When the Forty-third finally
departed for New York, the Burlington Daily Free Press was to report with
a sigh of relief, "This class of men will hardly be bidden farewell with
37
regret." Between 15 October and 15 November, Summary Court records
immortalize nine company members as AWOLs and one as drunk and disorderly
in quarters. The Regiment's AIYOL statistics were especially high just
prior to the rail journey to the port of embarkation on 15 November 1899.
On 6 November the company was tasked by Regiment to provide Private
Adam Unsinn as part of the ten man detail under Major Henry T. Allen, the
Regiment's senior Major and commander of 3d Battalion, along with Second
Lieutenant F. W. Mills, for duty aboard the U.S. Army Transport Meade
berthed in New York harbor. The tents at Fort Ethan Allen were struck on
7 November and troops were crowded into the permanent barracks. All the
Regiment's heavy baggage was packed up and loaded onto twenty-five baggage
14
cars belonging to the Central Vermont railroad on 10 November and, after a
verbal altercation between railroad officials and Murray, were shipped to
Brooklyn.
Situation in the Philippines in November 1899
While the 43d struggled to complete its preparations for departure
from the increasingly frigid Vermont, it was quite unaware of the subtle
transformation in the state of military affairs taking place in the land
of its destination. Three days before the Meade sailed from New York, the
self-declared President of the Philippine Republic, Emilio Aguinaldo,
decreed the existence of a state of guerrilla war against the U.S. forces
throughout the archipelago following the sound beating of his army in open
39
warfare that summer and autumn. Because of this changed state the Ameri-
can command felt that the insurrection was on its last legs, a common
enough mistake. On 1 December Major Allen was to confess in a letter to
his wife Jeannie that he feared most of the fighting would be over by the
40
time the Regiment reached the Philippines. Soon, however, U.S. commanders
would realize the error of their hasty judgment.
As early as December 1898 Aguinaldo, recognizing certain qualities
of merit in him, sent Vicente Lukban to the Island of Samar from his
previous command in the Camarines. Selection of General Lukban for this
assignment was based as much upon his ability as a revenue collector as his
military skill. Aguinaldo 's choice proved to be as unlucky for the U.S.
forces to serve on Samar as it was fortunate for the insurgent cause.
Lukban 's would be the next to last major insurgent command to collapse, and
this would not occur until February 1902, almost a year after Aguinaldo'
s
41
capture on Luzon.
15
^m*zmmmr~*m
U.S. Army Transport Meade
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A second appointment made by Aguinaldo at about the same time,
4 January 1899, was that of Colonel Ambrosio Moxica to be military governor
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of Leytc. During the period of his command of insurgent forces on this
island, Moxica would find himself dependent upon the more effective Lukban
for both military and moral support. Still, be ordered the surrender of
his forces only after the capture of his commander in chief, Aguinaldo.
The Forty-third would soon find themselves in battle with the wily
and unpredictable guerrilla forces commanded by these two leaders. But on
13 November few in the Regiment were concerned with more major a problem
than loading troops aboard rail cars of the Rutland Railroad for the trip
43
to Weehawken, New Jersey.
The Forty- third Journevs to War
Except for those men placed on special duty by Regiment, six
deserters and Privates Clark, Webster, Kimball, Keough and Nolan who were
all later to pay for their tardy appearance, Company H loaded on its assigned
train on 13 November. Troop loading went smoothly throughout that cold but
clear day, the men marching to their cars in heavy marching order. Colonel
Murray, however, was later to describe the train accommodations to Weehawken
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on the thirteenth and fourteenth as beggaring description. The train
carrying Major Andrews' 1st Battalion struck a freight train with a result-
45ing three hour delay. Disembarking from their rail cars the Forty- third
must have made a Kiplingesque showing as they marched to their ship at
Pier 22, Brooklyn clad in their blue uniforms, tan campaign hats, canvas
leggins, and field gear with their Krags at shoulder arms. American
fighting men, off for the purpose of "civilizing the natives" of the Phili-
ppines, in Senator Lodge's words of 1898, or in the later penned soldiers'
17
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song, to "civilize 'em with a Krag."
With their baggage stowed on board the Meade , 42 officers and 1,072
enlisted men of the Forty-third, along with a load of Christmas gifts for
the men already in the Philippines, waited for their 15 November departure.
As is often the case in military operations, however, fog prevented sailing
until 6:30 a.m. the next day, leaving behind Privates Gurley and Pahlin of
Company H who had jumped ship.
The "Succinct History" of the Regiment describes the trip as
"exceedingly interesting and instructive." However, Major Allen, in one of
his frequent letters to his wife, states that on the first few days out the
ship received a beam wind putting "many under the weather." The Meade was
a sleek looking twenty-six year old foreign built steamer rated by the
49Quartermaster's Department at a capacity of 60 officers and 1,171 men.
On 16 November the commander established the initial list of calls
which suggested that no particularly demanding program was to be followed.
A revision was made to the list, to be effective on 21 November, which
included periods of daily physical exercise, a good indication that the
command had finally gotten its "sea legs." Company H was to perform its
daily fitness session on the main deck along with their fellow sufferers of
Companies G and K. Until disembarking at Manila life would begin at 6 a.m.
and cease at 10 p.m. each day with few exceptions.
Finally on 27 November the Meade anchored at Gibraltar for a one
day layover. Continuing through the Mediterranean the Regiment arrived at
Valetta, Malta at 9 a.m., 1 December. The ship berthed at 10:00 a.m. after
knocking off the bow sprit of a merchant vessel and nearly colliding with a
52
British man of war. Colonel Murray had issued orders for the troops to
18
assemble at 8:30 a.m. in blues, campaign hats, leggins and cartridge belts
without bayonets to be reviewed by the Governor of Malta ashore. Rain that
morning put that plan to rest, and the troops instead were granted shore
liberty at the rate of two hundred per day. The British were particularly
hospitable and accommodating to the Americans during their two day stay in
Malta, possibly due to their involvement in the South African War and the
resulting lack of much international support in that endeavor. Prior to
the Meade 's departure, the English treated the Forty-third's officers to a
53dinner at the Governor's Palace.
Colonel Murray commended the men for their creditable conduct
ashore, in spite of the fact that two men failed to make the ship prior to
its departure. Privates Keough, Lee and Casey of Company H made the ship
in time but received sentences of one month's confinement and loss of three
months' pay by summary court for overstaying their passes ashore. As the
Meade glided out of Valetta's harbor, with care this time, the crews of
54
thirty-four British ships of the line cheered their passage.
The small steamship reached Port Said at the northern entrance to
the Suez Canal on December 6 just long enough to make arrangements for the
ship to transit this water avenue and for short period ashore for some of
the officers and men. The time was sufficient for Private White, a member
of Company H, to return to the vessel forty minutes late and somewhat intoxi
cated. It was also long enough for some of the Regiment's soldiers to
purchase the first members of what was to become an ever-growing tribe of
monkeys which was soon to be the scourge of the ship. The bothersome
animals became such a torment to the Meade's captain that he threatened to
put them all ashore if the men failed to control their pets. On Sunday
19
1.
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Some Officers of the 43d with a
lady at Port Said, Egypt
Dec. 1899
Captain (Grandpa) Elliott, Regimental Quartermaster
1st Lieutenant John H. Evens, Co. K
1st Lieutenant Joseph T. Sweeney, Co. H
Mrs. Francis L. Buchannon, Red Cross Nurse
1st Lieutenant M. E. Morris, Co. I
2d Lieutenant Wilson, Co. H
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morning, the seventeenth, the largest of these apes broke his chain, leading
the soldiers and sailors on a merry chase from the promenade deck about the
ship until it was bagged by the men.
After several other uneventful port calls the Forty-third steamed
into Manila Bay. The date of arrival was 31 December 1899. That afternoon
at 3:40 p.m. crates were opened and khaki uniforms were issued to the men
for the first time. The next morning at 10:00 a.m. the men of the
Regiment began the new century by disembarking from their home of the past
forty-eight days and marching to the front through the streets of Manila.
Companies L and M, which had been recruited in California, and had
arrived with the Forty-fourth Volunteers aboard the City of Puebla
,
joined
at the Regiment's defensive position between San Francisco del Monte and
El Deposito on 4 January. For two weeks the entire Regiment remained on
outpost duty in this area known as the North line. During this period the
troops had the opportunity to become acclimated to the heat of the tropics
which was described by Major Allen as recalling Fort Riley, Kansas, but
57
with delightful nights. The company's program while in the outpost line
included a three day march north east to the town of San Jose and back, a
58
distance of over fifty miles. During this operation the men were able to
exercise their long neglected muscles as well as familiarize themselves with
the country around Manila. While in their positions north of Manila,
officers and men also quickly learned to discern the field soldiers from the
headquarters dandies:
In town it is easy to distinguish between the
officers from the front and those stationed
in Manila. The former wear soiled trousers,
leggings and blue shirts; the latter white
duck suits and white collars, etc. 59
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Nipa Barracks, Malate,
Luzon in 1899
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On 14 January the troops were moved from their line of outpost camps
and marched to Nipa Barracks, Malate, about one mile south of Manila's Pasig
River. There the men of the company were billeted in large bamboo barracks
with high nipa roofs and lined with matting. The stay at Malate was to
prove to be a short one. Orders for the occupation of the hemp ports had
been issued by General Otis, the U.S. Military Governor of the Philippines,
on the day the Regiment was moved from the North line.
PART II
Company H Moves South with the Kobbe Expedition
Brigadier General William A. Kobbe, U.S.V. was directed by General
Orders No. 5 on 15 January to occupy, in addition to several other areas,
three port towns on the Islands of Samar and Leyte . The stated purpose of
this move south was to open ports in these areas so that the trade in abaca
(Manila hemp) could be recommenced. The reason U.S. troops were now
required in the region was the presence of General Lukban on Samar and
General Moxica on Leyte.
About a month following his arrival on Samar in 1899, Lukban had
issued instructions to his customs officials regarding taxes and customs to
be collected. By the end of the year his agents had collected revenues of
over six million pesos, a very sizeable contribution to the insurgent war
chest on Luzon. A munitions factory was also set up on the island which
provided supplies of low grade, but still lethal, ammunition for his men's
fire arms. Using locally available minerals, salvaged materials and con-
verted sewing machines, the insurgents continued to produce cartridges even
after the capture of their main plant, near Catbalogan, by Allen's 3d
Battalion in January 1900. By the arrival of the Forty-third in Manila at
the turn of the century, both Lukban and Moxica had organized their respec-
tive island commands for partisan operations against invading U.S. forces.
These leaders had appointed municipal officials, sometimes after rigged
elections, proselytized the native populations and organized military
commands and guerrilla units.
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Lukban's munitions factory near
Catbalogan, Samar after its capture
by Allen's 3d Battalion
(Allen Papers, Library of Congress)
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The Filipino was not to prove the only enemy of the Americans in
Samar. The Island of Samar is a body of land about the size of Ohio laying
off the extreme southern tip of Luzon and is characterized by its high back-
bone of mountains from which swift streams boil to the sea. No roads
crossing the island existed in 1900, only winding jungle paths which some-
times ran along stream beds. The dense jungle undergrowth tore at a marching
soldier's uniform and caught on his equippage as slimy leaches burrowed into
his skin and sucked his blood. Once out of town it became a green and brown
nightmarish hell where even the insurgents' under-powered homemade bullets
and slashing bolo were equal to the Americans' Krag.
The army which Lukban led was a blend of Filipino regulars of
Tagalog and Bikol extraction brought from Luzon with their mixed inventory
of rifles, mainly Spanish Mausers and Remingtons taken from the defeated
Spanish army and some Krags, and Visayan irregulars. It is doubtful that
the untrained eye of the U.S. soldier could distinguish one from the other
as the Filipinos wore no uniforms and were indistinguishable from the
peaceful farmer working his fields. In most recorded engagements the bolo-
men outnumbered the riflemen by at least three to one. Sometimes the fana-
tical bolomen of Samar attacked American troops without fire-support of any
kind and sometimes with astonishing success as at Balangiga on 28 September
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1901. Tight control over these men was impossible, a characteristic of
guerrilla armies. Some of the excesses on the part of the Insurrectos of
Samar can be attributed to Lukban 's inability to impose a firm discipline
over his fighters. In some instances, such as when dealing with the moun-
tain bands called the "Dios Dios" men, a group of quasi -religious zealots
who would just as soon fight Lukban, the Bikol, as they would the strangers
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from a land 7,000 miles to the northeast, he had no control at all. Procla-
mation after proclamation was issued under Lukban's name attempting to
control his fighters but evidently with only limited success. In spite of
General Otis' optimistic statements that the soldiers of the Forty-third
"would only be up against a few Tagalogs sent down from Luzon to Samar and
Leyte," Murray's troops would soon find quite a different reception awaiting
them.
The American command in Manila brigaded the Forty-third and Forty-
seventh Infantry, U.S.V. and Light Battery G, Third U.S. Artillery and
placed them under control of General Kobbe. Major Gilmore's Second
Battalion, of which Company H was a part, boarded the chartered transports
Aeolus and Caste llano in Manila and sailed south on 18 January together with
four other transports and one navy gunboat, the USS Nashville . Enroute the
47th was landed at the towns of Sorsozon, Legaspi and Albay in Southern
Luzon. While the landings were taking place during the next few days, the
men of the company whiled away their time, swimming in Sorsozon Bay and
participating in boat races. Soon the games were done and the convoy moved
on, entering the harbor of Calbayog, Samar in the early morning hours of
26 January. At 8:20 a.m. the signal to land was sent from the Nashville
,
at which time the boats, into which men of Companies E, H and F were loaded,
raced to the shore. The landing, covered by the guns of the Nashville and
the recently arrived gunboat Helena , was unopposed. About 300 yards from
shore the troop -carrying launches grounded, requiring the men to scramble
out into the waist deep warm waters of the bay. Since Company H was in the
lead, the men were ordered to form a skirmish line by Captain Dey after
fin
which they swept through the virtually abandoned town of Calbayog.
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Soldiers of the 43d landing
on Samar, January 1900
(Allen Papers, Library of Congress)
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Captain Fair with Company E and part of Company F moved around Dey's left
and around the northern edge of town. From his location, Fair observed
insurgents belonging to Captain Rafael's 2nd Company in the foothills to the
northeast. The Battalion Commander directed Captain Dey to secure the town
after which Major Gilmore took command of Fair's force and moved towards the
enemy sighting. The troops with Gilmore and Fair came under fire from an
enemy cannon as they approached the hills. With the sound of musketry
crackling in the heights outside of Calbayog, Company H went about the
business of securing the town. Guards were posted on all public buildings
including the large church. Although the men of the company were missing
the fireworks in the hills, they were fortunate in not having to share the
pleasures of negotiating densely wooded hills on a very hot day. Later in
the day Gilmore, who had since been joined by Company G and the rest of
Company F, wearily returned to town after a running fight of about two
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miles
.
Battalion headquarters was soon established in the town's Tribunal
building. Quarters recently vacated by insurgents were designated to house
two of Gilmore 's four companies with the remainder billeting themselves in
two school buildings. Company H moved into the old barracks of the 2
Compania de Artilleria. In what was to become a ritual in every town the
Forty-third was to occupy, a street cleaning department was formed with
local natives. In this case, thirty or so "Chinos," ethnic Chinese, were
put to work policing the town. This practice, although a dull chore and
often a cause of friction between soldier and Filipino, was a major factor
in the low rate of debilitating disease among the soldiers of the Insurrec-
tion as compared to the Americans who fought in Cuba in 1898. Once firmly
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ensconced in this port town, the Americans commenced to extend the secured
area about the recently seized battalion post.
On the morning of 28 January Allen's Third Battalion landed at
Catbalogan putting Lukban to flight and, for the time being, pretty well
demoralizing the insurgent effort on Samar. In fact, Gilmore received
reports that the insurgents had been scattered to the four winds and that
General Lukban was heading north hoping to find refuge in southern Luzon.
The surrender of Colonel Zabatel, Lukban 's second in command on 11 February
seemed to confirm that Samar 's rebellion was at an end. However, with
patrols being sent out from Calbayog the Americans began to encounter signs
of enemy resistance. A patrol composed of Company F men and led by Major
Gilmore returned from a forty mile patrol into the interior on the night of
1 February reporting that they had received some ineffective fire on the
night of 30 January. The patrol also found that the insurgents had put the
torch to a part of the river town of Gandara.
Upon his return, the battalion commander was informed that one of
E Company's men, Private Johnson, had imbibed a little too much "vino" and
69had wandered off. On 3 February several parties were sent out to follow-
up on reports of Johnson. One patrol with 12 H Company men led by Lieu-
tenant Wilson traveled to Napora, eight miles distant, to investigate one
lead brought in by a native. Reaching the village around noon and finding
the information faulty, the detachment broke for dinner. Wilson departed
the town at 2:15 p.m. heading back to Calbayog. The muddy trail over which
they moved was lined on both sides with high tropical grass making it
impossible to observe anything from the trail. At intervals the route
crossed streams which had to be traversed over slimy logs. About twenty
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minutes inarch from Naporo the soldiers came to an area where the trail
opened up on one side with a thickly vegetated rise about forty yards from
the path across the open space. The troops, traveling in a fifty yard long
single file, shortly found themselves strung-out in the clearing. Suddenly
a volley from about fifteen rifles blasted from the hill followed quickly
by a second. By the second volley Wilson's men were flat in the mud, their
rifle butts firmly seated in the hollows of their shoulders, awaiting the
commands of their Lieutenant. The order came, "Fire at will, commence
firing!" A steady fire from both sides continued for about ten minutes
during which time Private C. P. Nolan took an emeny round through the fleshy
part of his left forearm, a painful, but not lethal wound. Then Wilson,
kneeling, commanded, "Rapid Fire! Commence Firing!" almost as though they
were on the drill field at Fort Ethan Allen. The small hillock virtually
exploded in a cloud of splintering bark, leaves and atomized bananas. The
enemy fire died out after each of the Americans had expended about fifty
rounds. For good measure their officer joined the firing with eight rounds
from his Colt revolvers. With Nolan's wound rinsed out and bandaged, the
procession continued along its course without further delay at the ambush
site. On the return march the patrol encountered another band of insurgents
just north of the town of Palales. With little ceremony the Americans took
these fifteen Filipinos under fire at a range of over 500 yards dropping
two of them. After this encounter the troops pressed on to the north to
r iu 70Calbayog.
The following morning Captain Dey took a twenty-five man detachment
from the company and along with Wilson returned to the area in which the
action had taken place. At Napora the villagers told the Americans that of
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the party of thirty insurgents only their Lieutenant and twenty of his men
raced back through the town after their ambush of Wilson's patrol the
previous afternoon. South of Napora at Balon, Dey's party bivouacked for
the night. The next morning the soldiers pushed on the Tambungan, the last
half mile was negotiated through a swamp waist deep in mud. At St. Louis
on the south side of the Gandara River, which they had crossed, the Ameri-
cans received a friendly welcome from the townspeople. In addition, a
reception committee of three citizens of Pelayo, sent by that town's Presi -
dente
,
met Captain Dey and requested that the patrol come to their town on
the bank of the Gandara. At Pelayo the Americans were able to witness at
first hand the poverty and famine that the war had already brought to the
island. From here they returned to Calbayog, partly by water to Santa
Margarita, then by "hiking" overland the rest of the way.
During the time the aforementioned activities were taking place
Gilmore and Allen received a proclamation signed by Colonel Murray, for
dissemination throughout the villages of Samar. The purpose of the document
was to explain the purpose of the American presence on the islands of Samar
and Leyte and to establish certain rules of conduct to be observed by the
citizenry.
Proclamation American
The Americans have come to the islands of
Samar and Leyte to open their seaports to the
commerce of the world, and not to oppress their
inhabitants, but to protect them in all their
rights of property and life.
No interference will be made by the Americans
with the religious rights or ceremonies of the
people.
All persons engaged in peaceful and lawful
pursuits may rest assured that they will receive
every protection that can be afforded them by the
Americans and all offenders against the laws may
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expect to receive full punishment for their
offenses
.
Until good order is established, the inhabi-
tants of all towns occupied by Americans will be
required to be in their homes, and all American
soldiers not on duty to be in their barracks, at
8 o'clock p.m., at which hour the church bell
will be rung. All unauthorized persons found on
the streets of such towns after 8:15 p.m., will
be arrested and taken before the officer command-
ing the military guard for examination.
All good people of the islands are requested
to assist the Americans in promoting peace and
good order. 71
The day following the signing of Murray's proclamation, Vicente
Lukban wrote his own newsletter. Dated 4 February 1900, the letter was
sent to "Local Presidentes . " It is not likely that this missive was written
in response to the "Proclamation American" as was to be Lukban's habit with
later U.S. announcements; however, it gives that effect. He presents a
dreary picture of the insurgent situation stating that, "our soldiers at
present are divided into small bands by force of hunger," elaborating that
the "troops (are) living on good edible roots." The insurgent leader
accused the "Yankees" of having come to the Philippines for the purpose
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"of exterminating us later, as they exterminated the Indians of America."
Although lacking subtlety, his pronouncements appear to have been effective,
especially during the early period of American military occupation.
Initially the army could count on reliable support only from the "Chinos,"
who were fearful of their lives at the hands of the Filipinos, and the
European businessmen who had commercial interests in the stability offered
by a military occupation. Continually citing the example of the North
American Indian and listing alleged brutalities perpetrated by soldiers of
the Forty-third against the people of Samar and Leyte, he was to maintain
his lonely struggle until 1902 when a combination of tough military measures
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and properly administered civic action stripped the insurgents of popular
support.
Witli the situation in the area apparently well in hand, as indicated
by the return of the towns' populations, the surrender of insurgent officers
and weapons, the disorganized enemy resistance and the seemingly hospitable
attitude toward the soldiers by the local people, General Kobbe, the Brigade
Commander, felt that the time had come to secure additional ports on
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Samar. On 19 February the company commander received his orders from
Battalion. Company H was to "proceed, fully equipped, with 200 rounds of
ammunition per man, and sixty (60) days rations, to Laguan, and there to
74
take station." This was typical of the fragmenting process which was
taking place throughout the archipelago. By 1 March 1901 the U.S. Army
75had garrisoned a total of 502 posts in the Philippines.
Major Gilmore embarked with H Company on the steamer Santander
Tuesday afternoon 20 February. The expedition sailed at 3 p.m. and landed
about a mile west of Laguan at about 5 a.m. the next morning. The landing
party composed of Major Gilmore, Lieutenant Wilson and thirty or so men
raced into this port town an hour later to the surprise of the awakening
natives. Sr. Primitivo Acebuche, the former presidente who had been a
captive of the insurgents at Catbalogan, accompanied Gilmore. The town,
which was to be the site of H Company headquarters, normally accommodated
a population of 8,000 or more souls but the troops found it partially
deserted on this day. The town was described by Lieutenant Wilson as about
as pretty as he had seen in the Philippines with several stone Spanish
style houses, recently built wooden houses and wide streets, a few of them
paved with some combination of concrete.
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Finding no resistance here, the Americans received a report that an
insurgent force under the leadership of Abrique was to the south, up the
Catubig River at a village called Bido. Gilmore took half of the company
with Lieutenant Sweeney in command, and the battalion adjutant Lieutenant
Stewart, transferred to a smaller steamer, the Cuco
,
which they found in
the harbor, and set off for Bido at noon. About an hour after leaving
Laguan, the Cuco received fire from entrenched enemy riflemen. The troops
responded with a vigorous fire of their own causing the Filipinos to
abandon their well prepared positions. Pursuit of the fleeing insurgents
was badly hampered after the first enemy volley since the vessel's captain
deserted the pilot house and sought refuge in the anchor chain, the wheel-
man was paralyzed with fear, and the crew went overboard. Finally getting
to the bank, the Americans discovered that the area in front of the firing
trench was laced with camouflaged wet ditches filled with sharpened bamboo.
Although warned earlier of their existence, several men still managed to
stumble into these treacherous man traps. Fortunately, no one was impaled
on the stakes. The soldiers pursued the guerrillas several miles but were
unable to reestablish contact, and, therefore, returned to the Cuco for the
trip back to Laguan.
Captain Dey now set about his mission of turning this semi-deserted
town into a viable commercial hemp port once more. General Kobbe had
already appointed the company's junior lieutenant as Inspector of Customs
and Captain of the Port of Laguan. Ten thousand picos of hemp were found
awaiting shipment during the company's inventory. Of course, the routine
cleaning, draining, and lighting of the streets was commenced. Laguan 's
Presidente was authorized by Gilmore to keep his force of thirty policemen
3b
Coastal steamer of the
type used for troop transportation
on Saraar and Leyte
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which had been on the town's payroll before his imprisonment.
The plan of action before leaving Calbayog had been for half of
Company H to garrison Catarman once Laguan was securely occupied. However,
once on the scene, Gilmore and Dey decided that the occupation of Catubig,
directly south of Laguan up the Catubig River, would offer greater advan-
tages. Although the former town had an advantage over the latter in hemp
supplies, Catubig was situated in a large rice producing area, and its
occupation would deny its use to the enemy as a base of operations.
Harry Dey gave the mission of taking station at Catubig to his
first lieutenant, Joseph Sweeney, who, together with fifty men from the
company and the battalion commander, loaded on the Cuco for the thirteen
mile journey up the river. The trip on 22 February was accomplished with-
out enemy sightings. Sweeney's detachment arrived and moved carefully from
the river bank into the town, finding it abandoned save for the fifty-six
Chinese who had been rounded up by the insurgents. The "Chinos," whose
future at the hands of the insurrectos had been uncertain, were set at
liberty by the Americans. The men took possession of the abandoned convent
building adjacent to the large stone church which would serve as a combi-
nation barracks and supply and orderly room until disaster struck that
spring.
Catubig, in normal times, had a population of about 10,000, but as
was usually the case, prior to arrival of the blue-shirted soldiers, the
Filipino inhabitants fled into the hills. As has been noted before, Lukban
had over one year to move about Samar telling tales on the Americans and
their barbarities to the natives. Whether or not the Visayans swallowed
the insurgent's stories is not certain, but it certainly was logical for
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Company H Soldiers at Laguan prior to a hike
From left to right
Front Row: Lindsey, Casey, White, Flavin
and Connors
Back Row: McCabe, Kerrins,* Dey, and
Sweeney, D.J.
rkilled at Catubig, 18 April 1900
39
the people to adopt a wait and see attitude before delivering themselves
into the hands of the invaders. Usually the townspeople would begin to
trickle into the newly occupied pueblos several days following the arrival
of U.S. soldiers.
Prior to parting company with Sweeney, Gilmore appointed a temporary
town presidente, Sr. Thomas Tafalla and gave verbal instructions for the
lieutenant to take a patrol to Poponton to the south as soon as things
quieted down at Catubig. Sr. Tafalla informed him that he had received
orders from Abrique to slay the Chinese who had been assembled by the
guerrillas, but it was retracted upon the presidente 's refusal to obey.
Major Gilmore was also told of two letters Tafalla had received from Lukban
in the mountains near Matiginao. Both messages urged all soldiers to
rendezvous near Matiginao with their weapons within five days. The Major
concluded that the insurgent leader's purpose was not to fight but to
assemble all his riflemen and officers for surrender to the Americans,
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taking advantage of the amnesty.
The battalion commander returned back down the river to Laguan and
departed on the steamer Santander from there before dawn on 28 February.
Before he left, Gilmore, acting on another report, directed Captain Dey to
scout the mountains around Palapag to the east. The company commander took
fifteen men on 26 February to check out the information which claimed that
Abrique was in the area. The patrol failed to find the guerrilla officer
but uncovered and destroyed about seventy sacks of rice stored in a house
for probable insurgent use. The next days were busy but uneventful.
Consolidation of the company's two bases continued as did the constant
patrolling required for security. It was still a period of optimism in
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which the Americans were sure it was just a matter of days before Lukban
would accept the generous terms of surrender and come in with his entire
force of Tagalogs. A long term plan of counter-guerrilla operations does
not seem to have occurred to the commanders of the Forty -third at this
time. But then, why should there be any great concern? 'Hie villagers were
returning to their homes. Even in Catubig some of the townsfolk were
returning. Joe Sweeney interpreted the failure of the bulk of that town's
population in returning was due to the requirement for them to be out
working in their fields.
On the evening of 5 March Major Gilmore, accompanied by Major Allen,
Third Battalion commander, arrived at Catubig on the steamer San Bernardino
which had been borrowed from Warner, Barnes and Co. Sweeney briefed the
battalion commanders on his current situation. Everything was quiet in and
around the town. A large number of people had come in last Sunday the 1st
but left again by the next day. After the briefing, Gilmore gave Sweeney
an order dated 3 March, instructing him to take twelve men from his garrison
and proceed overland from Catubig to Gandara. The route to be followed
started in Poponton, continued on to Matiginao, which had been mentioned in
a number of reports of enemy activity, thence to Gandara where the patrol
would take a boat down the Gandara River and around the coast to Calbayog.
Once at the battalion headquarters, a full report of the trip was to be
submitted along with a sketch map. The reason Sweeney was restricted to
only twelve men resulted from Gilmore 's patrol experience in January and
February during which he ascertained that sufficient food was not available
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in the back country to sustain a large body of soldiers. It was also
felt that better time could be made with a smaller detachment and, at any
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rate, reports had indicated that few insurgents were left in the mountains.
Sweeney formed his detachment early on the morning of 7 March.
After a final inspection to ensure his men were prepared for their three or
four day "hike," the patrol departed. After a full day's march up the
Catubig River valley Sweeney reached Poponton where he would spend the
night. Next morning the troops were assembled and moved out accompanied by
a Visayan guide provided by the town's Presidente. The American lieutenant
was uneasy as he regarded Presidente Filici Tuling with suspicion, but since
he was at a disadvantage knowing neither the local language nor the trail
system he would have to depend on the appointed guide.
Unknown to Sweeney on 8 March was the existence of another small
American patrol being sent from Gandara this day to rendezvous with him at
Matiginao. This detachment of eleven men led by First Lieutenant Delbert
R. Jones, Company G, was to map the trail from Gandara to Matiginao, but
as it turned out, accomplished a great deal more.
Three fifteen p.m. on Wednesday the 8th found the Company H patrol
about one half hour's distance from Matiginao moving down a stream bed, ten
to thirty feet in width, with steep banks on either side. At this point
some of the men halted to fill their canteens in the stream. Without any
warning a hail of bullets rained down upon the Americans from both banks.
Realizing he was in an effective crossfire, he assaulted up the slope on the
right side, driving off one group of assailants. Once in the enemy position
he found that two men were wounded and Private Webster was missing. Private
Mean had taken a round in the left wrist while Private Clancy had a flesh
wound over the hip. Not knowing Webster's fate, Sweeney asked for two
volunteers to accompany him and make a search under heavy fire from the
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insurrectos. Corporal Allport and Private Jordan immediately came forward
and with their lieutenant braved the storm as their remaining comrades
covered them with their Krags. Back down into the stream bed the three
scrambled only to find Webster laying dead in a pool of his own blood with
bullet wounds in the stomach and head. The enemy fire then became so heavy
that the rescuers had to leave the body and retreat to the captured enemy
position. While retracing their steps the corporal received a bullet in
the abdomen, Private Jordan was hit in the right shoulder resulting in an
ugly, painful wound; and Sweeney was lucky enough to come back with just a
superficial wound to the left thigh.
Back in the enemy's position which he had overrun earlier, the young
lieutenant took stock of his situation. He had four men wounded signifi-
cantly enough to be of little use in the fight, one of them possibly dying,
and one man dead in between the lines. His men still had ample ammunition
for their rifles, since troops had a practice of putting as many rounds as
possible in their haversacks, sometimes at the expense of food, and their
cartridge belts held a hundred more when filled. In addition, in the
insurgents' horseshoe-shaped trench a cannon was found with a supply of
ammunition for it. The problem would be food, water, and communications
with the outside world. This was in the days before the compact field
radio, and when a detachment went into the jungle it was in reality "de-
tached" from the next higher command. Sweeney decided that, since he had
nine effectives still with him, he would be a fool to attempt to dispatch
a messenger, especially since he estimated the ambushers to be at the
strength of about forty to fifty rifles with at least one more cannon and
since his messenger would be unfamiliar with the country.
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In this situation the Americans decided to fight it out from their
position and attempt to outlast the enemy. During a lull in the fighting,
probably caused by the insurgent leaders considering their next move, the
wounded had their injuries dressed and bound by the lieutenant. The
captured cannon was put into operation by the soldiers who supplemented
their fire power with it until the next morning when it ran out of ammuni-
tion. At 9 o'clock on Friday morning the enemy, commanded by Rosario,
attempted to force the issue. Firing two cannon shots at the Americans
from a range of fifty yards, the insurgents assaulted with eighteen rifle-
men. After four were dropped in a withering response from the American
Krags, the Filipinos retired to their original positions.
The remainder of the battle degenerated into an endurance contest.
Every time a wounded man groaned or a man moved a brisk fire would ensue.
By noon on Friday the men had exhausted their water, and since the only
available source lay under the guns of the enemy no one was sent to replenish
the supply at this time. At about 5 a.m. on Saturday the firing ceased but
the Americans dared not move from their secure position for fear of being
caught in the open, plus the problem of moving the wounded. In the early
evening of that day the heavens opened and deluged the Americans with rain.
Sweeney directed the men to dig small holes in the ground with their
bayonets and attempt to capture some water in their ponchos. But instead
of a Godsend it lasted just long enough to drench the soldiers' clothing
and add to the misery. Spending a night in the jungle in a wet uniform ,
especially if movement is curtailed and no fires can be built, is a wretched
experience virtually impossible to explain to the layman. Along with the
scarcity of rations and water, the abundance of biting insects and crawling
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Soldiers of Allen's 3d Battalion
with a captured insurgent cannon
(Allen Papers, Library of Congress)
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things, and the stench of decaying dead men, these days would be ones that
the survivors would not forget in their lifetimes. Sunday night Sweeney
finally let two volunteers crawl out and fill some haversacks with water,
which was accomplished without interference.
Lieutenant Jones 1 party from Company G had, in the meantime, arrived
at Matiginao on Saturday afternoon. After waiting for the arrival of
Sweeney for the next two days Jones concluded that the H Company patrol
must have had their orders rescinded; and, therefore, he prepared to return
to Gandara on Tuesday. For some reason he decided to send out one more
reconnaissance party, before departing the area, which by accident came
across Sweeney's thoroughly exhausted force. The hospital corps man with
the G Company patrol did what he could for the injured. Then both parties
moved back to Matiginao where native barotas were secured for a trip down
the Gandara River and eventually to Calbayog arriving there at 7:30 p.m.
on Wednesday. Major Gilmore would later describe in a report that "Lieut.
Sweeney's detachment from Catubig arrived at Calbayog on the 14th in a
rather forlorn state." Corporal Joseph W. Allport who volunteered to
recover a fallen fellow soldier died ten days after his wounding, while
enroute to the hospital in Manila. It was later established that Rosario
had been warned in advance of Sweeney's approach and was able to prepare
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positions prior to the Americans' arrival.
In response to the ambush Gilmore ordered Company G on 15 March to
send out forty men with fifteen days' rations to the ambush area in an
attempt to find and destroy Rosario' s band. Company H was also directed to
obtain an additional fifty soldiers from Captain Cooke, whose F Company had
occupied Catarman, and to station a force at Poponton to make contact with
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the same guerrillas. Captain Dey and Lieutenant Stcrrett of Cooke's company
took their force to the south but found nothing.
With the attack on Sweeney near Matiginao the Second Battalion
suddenly found its hands full. On 20 March two Spaniards from Gandara
reported that area to be swarming with insurgents. A wounded soldier from
Lieutenant Seaman's detachment at La Granja arrived at Calbayog on 23 March
aboard the Cuco reporting an attack on that town by a party of insurrectos
made under cover of darkness in a rain storm. When Gilmore arrived at La
Granja at 9 that same night, he was informed of many reports of large
bodies of insurgents in the mountains.
If these activities were not sufficient to shake the Second Batta-
lion's complacency, the predawn raid on Calbayog of 26 March would leave no
question as to the seriousness of the war on Samar. Nor would there be any
misunderstanding of the kind of conflict into which the Americans had been
thrus t
.
Why the officers at Calbayog would allow lax security measures at
this time is hard to understand. Possibly it was a case where "wolF' had
been called once too often. Then again, since the bolomen attacked just
prior to daybreak, that overwhelming sense of wellbeing that tends to over-
come sentinels just before sunrise could have been the primary ally of the
guerrilla raiders.
In any event an insurgent leader named Hoy held a meeting with a
group of other Visayans in a sympathizer's house in a small vista between
San Policarpo and Oquendo . At the meeting a plan was made over glasses of
vino for an assault on the officer's quarters in Calbayog. Nineteen men
had been gathered, all armed with bolos. Before leaving they all took an
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oath "to establish the supremacy of the church." Just before 5 a.m. on the
morning of 26 March the insurrectos crossed the bridge leading to San
Policarpo and moved swiftly into Calbayog avoiding Captain Fair's single
roving patrol. Once in town the Filipinos, bent on assassination, split
into two groups. About five headed for the Tribunal which housed the
battalion headquarters and staff sleeping quarters, the remainder made for
the cuartel area where the troop barracks and other officers' quarters were
located.
The party racing to the Tribunal to kill Gilmore, who was not even
in town this night, had to pass by the post hospital where they encountered
the guard, Private Oliver N. Pendergrass of Company E. Before he could
sound the alarm one of the bolomen struck him a blow that sliced off the
right side of his face and cut into the shoulder blade. Although stricken
by this wound and another in the side, he managed to crawl to Captain Fair's
quarters and give the alarm. The initial struggle also aroused the patients
in the hospital. Private Jordan of H Company, severely wounded near
Matiginao on 8 March, and Private David L. Jackson from Company E, who had
been assisting at the hospital, secured weapons and fired on the insurgents
through the open windows of the hospital. Jordan, whose fractured right
shoulder was still healing, was undeterred as he placed his still fouled
Krag to his shoulder and sprayed bullets into the street below. Because of
the dirty weapon's recoil he rebroke his shoulder, which would bother him
for the rest of his life. The work done by the two men left one dead and
two wounded insurgents sprawled in the street before the hospital.
One of the assassins was able to get into the Tribunal, however.
This man went in search of the officers but unable to find them, although
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Lieutenant (Doctor) Dudley Welch was reposing in his darkened room, killed
the major's cook, Private Unsinn from Company II, in his sleep. The thud of
the assassin's bolo cutting into Unsinn woke the doctor who escaped. He
notified Fair who had just formed the bulk of his Company E in a double
rank with bayonets fixed and had taken the remaining insurrectos under
fire. Dr. Welch with Corporal Laird and Private Mesick, both of Company E,
quickly returned to the Tribunal to capture the bolo man. They found him
skulking in Major Gilmore's bedroom. The soldiers attacked with their
fixed bayonets, but the man counterattacked slicing Corporal Laird in the
arm. Then skillfully wielding the large knife he struck at Mesick who
parried the blow with his rifle, losing the end of his finger for his
trouble. This cut also severed the leather rifle sling and chopped half an
inch into the weapon's stock. Eventually the Americans' cold steel pre-
vailed, and the Filipino went down permanently.
After Fair organized his forces, the insurgents fled, realizing the
surprise was lost and the game was up. The Battalion mustered about one
hundred men from Companies E, G and H who were formed into three search
parties under Captain Fair and Lieutenants Sweeney and Phillips. These
parties cleared the town of guerrillas, arresting several. In the ensuing
days a number of other participants were rounded up after the capture of
the band's muster roll. In all, eight insurgents were killed or died of
wounds, three were wounded and six were captured. U.S. losses were one
killed, a second died of his wounds and two others were wounded. That this
attack provided an object lesson to the Americans can be seen from a comment
made by Gilmore in his report on the affair in which he stated, "we were
not fighting civilized beings, but assassins who would murder one in his
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80bed at night." With these realities in mind the Americans reacted in the
inevitable manner. Said Lieutenant Wilson in a letter home written on the
26th from Laguan:
Sergeant Graham is out with 25 men now in
search of Captain Aubuque with orders to
take no prisoners. In fact such orders are
understood generally. 81
Catubig
When Dey and Gilmore decided to station troops at Catubig back in
late February, they realized that the garrison was being put out on a limb.
Overland communication was difficult and slow, and use of waterways was
limited by the shortage of suitable water craft to transport men and
supplies. Most steamers used by the Forty-third in Samar were on loan from
the business concerns located on the island or were privately owned. The
battalion commander displayed concern when he instructed Captain Dey to
visit the garrison stationed there personally once or twice weekly. By mid
April the Catubig garrison was down to thirty-one men commanded by Sergeants
William J. Hall and Dustin L. George due to the absence of Sweeney's detach-
ment and evacuation of sick men. Because of the deteriorating situation
Major Gilmore had decided to close out the station and bring the thirty-one
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men back to Laguan. With the increasing incidence of attacks on American
garrisons on Samar by large bodies of Lukban's men it was doubtful whether
small garrisons were capable of holding out. That Dey was aware of Gilmore 's
decision in sufficient time to react is questionable. There is no mention
of any order to withdraw the Catubig garrison in Dey's reports nor is there
any evidence in the Regimental records of any such order.
In accordance with his standing orders from battalion, Captain Dey
paid a visit to Catubig on Saturday 14 April. Sergeant George, the acting
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commander, reported everything quiet in the area. The detachment was still
quartered in the convent located between the church and a high hill.
In the mountains of north central Samar is the town of San Jose.
The town served General Lukban as his headquarters at this time. In late
March an American captive was brought here after a brutal march which had
lasted about fifteen or so days. The prisoner was Sergeant Doe of Company
I who had survived capture along with Corporal Allen when both were taken
near Borongan on the east coast of Samar in mid March. The two were the
first Americans taken prisoner by Lukban's forces and, therefore, were quite
a curiosity. Sergeant Doe was brought to San Jose while Allen had been left
at a camp at San Julian because of the bad condition of his feet. While at
San Jose, Doe met Lukban whom he described as forty-six years old and about
the normal height for a Tagalog. He was dressed in linen drawers tied
about the ankles and a cotton shirt and was bareheaded and footed. With
Lukban were a group of officers reported by the Sergeant to be Colonel
Abuque, Captains Surano and Dodo, and Second Teniente Acedillo. The day
after meeting the guerrilla officers and their leader, Lukban assembled a
body of men, gave them a hearty pep talk, and then sent them off under
Acedillo. Doe counted them from his place of imprisonment and estimated
the force to consist of 193 riflemen armed with Mausers, Remingtons, and
eleven or twelve Krags . Supplementing this party was a force of over five
hundred bolomen. The men wore no uniform but were similarly dressed in the
native garb made of hemp fiber. Lukban departed the next day and was gone
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for about two weeks. They were all headed for the town of Catubig.
At daybreak on 15 April, Easter Sunday, the battle began. The first
shots rung out from the hill behind the convent at 5:30. The Americans
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immediately took cover in the convent and fired back. Soon the entire tovm
resounded with the rifle reports of the insurgents and soldiers. Initially,
there were no casualties among the men of the garrison. Throughout Sunday
the battle raged with no apparent advantage going to either foe. The
shooting was kept up during the night but only at a reduced volume. At 5
the next morning heavy fire was resumed by the Filipinos. Cannon fire
commenced three hours later from the hill to the right of the barracks.
Using a load of nails, chain fragments, and iron scraps the insurrectos
were attempting to reduce the convent to rubble. This attempt resulted
instead in a hurricane of Krag bullets which silenced the gun after two
volleys from the besieged Americans. The heavy rifle fire from the insur-
gents slackened after midnight only to resume with full fury at 9 a.m. on
Tuesday. The cannon which had repositioned during the night was put into
action again with the same results as before.
By Tuesday morning the situation had deteriorated drastically for
the men of the company. The enemy had managed to get into the church only
five yards from the convent, and the fire of their riflemen was making the
American position untenable. Insurrectos in the church were also creating
anxiety by attempting to throw blazing bundles of hemp soaked in kerosene
against the convent. Up to this time the soldiers had survived almost
unscathed except for Private Lee who had a bullet wound in his left arm.
Sergeant George realized that continued enemy occupation of the
church would eventually spell disaster to his small command. Calling for
volunteers George assembled ten men for a counterattack against the Filipino
position. Bursting out of the convent at a dead run under tremendous fire
from all sides, the troops gained entry to the church. Storming in they
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found between seventy-five and one hundred insurgents inside. Quick calcu-
lation by the sergeant convinced him that they had little chance of
succeeding in their foray; so the soldiers emptied their magazines into the
mass of Filipinos, causing a certain amount of slaughter, and then fell
back to the convent. Returning through the same gauntlet a second time,
the>' surpri singly made it back to shelter with no casualties.
At about this time the foe had finally managed to set fire to the
American position. The men kept their fire up even through the heat and
choking smoke of the blaze. Sergeant George began to prepare his men for
an attempt to break out through their besiegers. Even though the battle
was in its third day there were still seven to eight thousand rounds of .30
caliber ammunition on hand. This was distributed to the men, each putting
his share into his haversack. All other quartermaster equipment was thrown
into the blaze. When the building was burning well enough, a hole was cut
in the floor and the men dropped through it into the basement. From here
the soldiers attempted to make their way down the street past the church.
The enemy fire here was so severe that the detachment turned down another
street towards the river but again was turned back by insurgents entrenched
in a house. Out in the open with bullets snapping past them, the breakout
degenerated into a panic. Fifteen of the men ran for a boat house on the
river hoping to seize a boat and attempt to cross. All were killed in this
try. The second group with Sergeant Hall and Corporal Carson made their
way to a small grassy knoll and prepared to defend.
By now Sergeant Hall had been hit, so command of the survivors went
to Anthony Carson. Carson's detachment numbered sixteen counting himself.
He posted guards and ordered the others to dig a trench using their
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bayonets. Once the position was hacked out of the earth it was just a matter
of holding out as long as he could with the remaining men. Tuesday night
came and went, and the fight continued into Wednesday under the searing
tropical sun. The Filipinos had made several attempts to set the grass
ablaze but had been driven back leaving the field littered with dead and
wounded. As darkness fell that night the men breathed a sigh of relief.
Besides being able to move around a little under cover of the night, they
realized that they had survived another day. But could they hold out much
longer without additional food, water or ammunition?
While this lonely struggle was going on in the jungle, actions were
taking place elsewhere which would lead to Carson's salvation. Sweeney
returned to Laguan on 18 April with the revitalized survivors of his March
ordeal in the mountains. Since the ambush they had remained at Calbayog
until the wounds were healed and transportation was available. Now, Captain
Dey decided, was the time to send Lieutenant Sweeney back to his command at
Catubig. The steamer Lao -ang departed Laguan with the Lieutenant and his
detachment, composed of seven men from Company H and ten men on loan from
F Company, at 7:30 in the morning of 19 April. One mile from the objective
the Lao - ang 's progress was stopped by a barrier of felled trees lashed
together across the river. Security elements were landed on both banks
while the remainder of the party assaulted the obstacle with axes. During
the removal of the blockade the men found that another large pre -cut tree
had been rigged to fall when a boat made contact with a rope attached to it
and secured on the opposite bank. This booby trap was disarmed. Sweeney
also found four nipa houses on the river bank with a supply of over a
hundred pounds of beef which was thrown into the river and one hundred
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fifty pounds of rice which he confiscated. Then the buildings were burned.
With these matters disposed of the detachment recommenced their boat trip.
The Americans' fears were confirmed when, still a quarter mile below
Catubig, they detected the sounds of battle. It was now apparent that the
routine mission of reinforcing the garrison had evolved into one of rescue.
The arrival at the town was greeted with a storm of bullets splintering the
steamer's wooden hull and clanging off the metal of its power plant. Boats
were lowered and the tricky business of disembarking began. In spite of the
cover provided by the detachment's Krags, Corporal White, Company F, took a
round in the left side and Private Farron of Company H received a wound in
his right calf while clambering into the boats. After getting the wounded
back aboard the Lao - ang , the relief force made its way to the river bank.
Having already located the beleaguered garrison by shouting from the steamer,
Sweeney's men sprinted across seventy five years of bullet-swept open ground
bent low over their weapons. During the rush, another H Company man,
Private Clancy, went down with a wound in his right instep. The rescuers
now down to thirteen effectives reached the vicinity of the entrenched Carson
without further losses. Sweeney decided not to join Carson because he would
lose effective observation over the enemy positions in the tall grass.
Instead he sent two men to Carson's position where they assisted in burying
his dead, Privates Pomelow and Loose, in the trenches and brought back the
thirteen survivors. The sight that met the relief party 's eyes was savage.
Part of the town, including the convent, was a smoldering ruin while several
other buildings were still blazing. The streets were choked with insurgent
dead which Sweeney estimated to be about two hundred while several others
bobbed about in the currents of the Catubig River. The Americans fought
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their way back to the river bank and reembarked, leaving the town to the
victorious insurgents and the dead. The return was uneventful except where
the enemy had attempted to reerect their obstacle which was so flimsily
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constructed that it disintegrated upon contact with the steamer.
Lukban, who claimed to have personally commanded the insurgent
force, captured twenty five of the American rifles along with 12,000 rounds
Or
at Catubig. A more grisly incident was the disinterment and mutilation
beyond recognition of the bodies of Loose and Pomelow by the enraged
guerrillas. Lukban had directed that American dead be dug up since he
claimed that sometimes their weapons and ammunition were buried with their
remains. The added butchery was probably done as a matter of personal
taste by some of the bolomen. Corporal Anthony J. Carson was recommended
87for the Medal of Honor which was awarded to him in 1906.
Because of the heavy losses sustained by Company H and the surge in
enemy activity on the north coast of Samar, Gilmore began to consolidate.
On 28 April he sent his adjutant, Lieutenant Seaman to Catarman with orders
for Captain Cooke to move his Company F to Laguan as soon as possible.
Captain Dey had already received twenty men from E Company at Calbayog but
the battalion commander there realized that his weakened garrison was not
immune to a foray by Lukban.
F Company's commander received his orders to move from Catarman the
next day. On 30 April he sent Seaman in a small steamer to Laguan for the
larger vessel, the Lao - ang , which he would borrow to move his unit. At
9:30 that night his outposts were driven in by the insurgents. The next day
Company F counterattacked and overran the guerrilla trenches. By the end
of the day on 1 May, he had scattered the enemy force burying 117 in their
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Second Battalion Officers at Laguan, Samar
1st Lt. Seaman was Bn. Adjutant
Capt. Cooke and 1st Lt. Sterrett were from
Company E
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own trenches. On the 3rd, most of F Company boarded the steamer San Bernar-
dino and traveled to Laguan, coming under Captain Dey's command. On the
4th Catarman was abandoned to the insurgents.
Sunday morning before dawn, 6 May, Major Gilmore, who had arrived
on Friday, departed Laguan with one hundred men including thirty five from
Company H under Captain Dey. The force encountered shacks of an enemy
outpost, evidently meant for keeping an eye on the activity of the U.S.
troops at Laguan one mile distant. About three miles further down the
trail to Pambujan, the objective of this patrol, was a bridge crossing a
sixty yard wide river. The center of this bridge had been removed for a
length of about thirty feet. While the column waited for about an hour,
some of the men were put to work patching the gap. Pambujan, another north
coast town, was finally reached at 10 in the morning. The town was found
abandoned except for about five men who rushed from one of the houses and
melted into the surrounding forest and two boys. The two youngsters were
questioned with unproductive results. Because of the heat several of the
soldiers had been overcome, so Gilmore rested the patrol until 3 o'clock
that afternoon.
About three miles from the town, as the patrol retraced its route,
two insurgents were sighted and fired upon. One of them was hit. It was
later learned that they were scouts sent to observe the Americans. The
trail along which they moved was typical of the jungle routes on Samar,
narrow and bordered on both sides by dense underbrush and high grass.
Eventually Gilmore's point came upon the bridge repaired earlier that
morning.
A cold sweat came over the men at the front of the file when they
saw the bridge had again been rendered unusable. About the same time the
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security men spotted a man partially hidden in the underbrush and Immedi-
ately opened fire on him, Before the sound of these initial shots faded,
Major Gilmore who was located in the middle of the file saw several others
in the dense growth to the right of the path and opened fire on them with
his Colt. Suddenly the thick foliage was alive with bolomcn who until now
had lain hidden. The men blazed away at the enemy driving them away. A
group of enemy riflemen observed on the other side of the damaged bridge
were also taken under fire and scattered. After it appeared that the
insurrectos had been routed, a careful search was made for others. Periodi
cally a soldier would be surprised as a hidden boloman would leap out of
his concealed position and attack the man who had virtually stepped on him.
Twelve of the thirteen dead bolomen counted were killed within five feet
of the trail. Gilmore later realized that the enemy plan was to fire on
his point from across the river, and, when the Americans had deployed, the
slashing bolomen would fall on their rear. In a close quarters fight it
was understood that the bolo-wielding Visayan was more than equal to his
American rifle-equipped foe. As it was, the only American casualty was a
man from F Company who had been slashed in the lower leg. The tired group
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closed in to Laguan at eight that night without any more enemy contact.
With a rest of only two days the battalion commander, this time
accompanied by Lieutenants Wilson and Sweeney of Company H and Lieutenants
Sterrett and Seaman set out again on 8 May with a patrol of about one
hundred men from Companies H, E and F. Besides the two lieutenants, H
Company provided forty troops. The Lao - ang was again borrowed from its
owner, a Spanish merchant in Laguan named Thomas Oria, and the expedition
set out for Catubig. There were indications along the river that the
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insurgents were attempting to block its access to the Americans. Small
native barotas loaded with stones had been sunk, and several rope and
twisted vine barriers were encountered. An insignificant body of guerrilla
troops who were occupying the town when Gilmore arrived took to their heels
causing no problems. The enemy had cleaned up the battlefield pretty well
but the soldiers discovered the town full of stores. In addition to re-
burying the mutilated bodies of Loose and Pomelow, the town, or what
remained following the fight in April, was put to the torch. On the trip
back down the Catubig River, stops were made to destroy caches of insurgent
supplies and to incinerate the towns of Bayog and Bigo. The only American
casualty of the trip was an F Company private who fell into a mantrap
receiving a puncture wound in the hand. Throughout the remainder of May
and most of June 1900, Company H in conjunction with Company F continued
patrolling through the small towns on Samar's north coast razing San Miguel,
the insurgent headquarters for the region, and destroying hidden rice and
palay supplies. Major Allen had written in a letter to his wife on 20
April, "these natives have mistaken a mild manner for weakness and now they
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are to be disillusioned." The army was now to turn the screw.
Soldier Life in Samar
The men were worked hard during their occupation of Samar. But
beside the constant patrolling and infrequent but deadly encounters with
the insurrectos there was another side to the soldiers' lives.
As is usual in army life, most of the soldiers' duty time was spent
in mundane and uninspiring activities. Since the health of both the command
and the native inhabitants of every town occupied depended on sanitation,
the soldiers' first task was frequently an area clean-up. A temporary
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presidente's first task after being appointed by the local U.S. commander
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was to get his realm "thoroughly policed and lighted." The bewildered
townspeople, personally clean as a general rule, were pressed into service
until the job was done. Sometimes, as already noted in the case of Calbayog,
a street cleaning department was established to keep the towns sanitary.
Passive health measures were not the only actions taken to keep the
command physically fit. Prior to departure from the United States all men
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received innoculations at Fort Ethan Allen. And to insure continuation
of medical services Acting Assistant Surgeon John F. Leeper and Private
William L. Gist, Hospital Corps, were assigned to Laguan to set up the
92hospital early in May 1900. Leeper was not a commissioned officer but a
civilian physician hired by the Medical Department, as were a large number,
by contract. Acting Assistant Surgeons were entitled to the same respect
and obedience from the enlisted men as an officer and were authorized to
wear the rank of a first lieutenant except that straps and ornaments were
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to be in silver instead of gold. John Leeper remained with Company H
until its departure from the Philippines. The doctor treated those Fili-
pinos to which he had access as well as the soldiers.
Of course, pills and shots alone do not maintain a man's well being.
Food was another area of concern for the company officers, especially Second
Lieutenant Wilson who was on orders as the post commissary of Calbayog and
later of Laguan, the sort of honor usually bestowed on the junior-most
lieutenant. It appears that most of the army rations consumed by the troops
were shipped to the Philippines from outside the theater. An Inspector
General's report filed in 1899 indicated that cold storage ships arriving
in Manila brought Australian beef and U.S. grown potatoes and onions.
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Roasted and ground coffee was procured in Manila. Lieutenant Wilson, in a
letter dated 16 February 1900, recounts the arrival of a ship at Calbayog
bearing two months rations and sales to officers, a cargo totalling 190,000
pounds. In a letter dated 28 July 1900 a Regular Army soldier stationed
with the Sixth U.S. Infantry on the island of Panay described meals he ate
on 27 July.
Friday
Breakfast
Slum (Beef stew), oatmeal $ milk, bread, coffee
Dinner
Steak $ gravy, peas, stewed onions, bread, coffee
Supper
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Rice, milk,prunes, bread, coffee.
It is risky to assume the soldiers' meals on Panay were the same as those
on Samar. However, Holston's menu so closely resembles the meals planned
for the Forty-third troop mess aboard the Meade that it is probably safe
95in this case to make this presumption. Moreover, since Panay was also in
the Department of Visaysa, it is logical to conclude that they were shipped
the same rations from Manila.
Lest we forget, there is also food for the soul, pay, mail and
recreation. The Private's pay in 1900 had not changed much from the days
of the Indian wars in the west. Second Class Privates drew $15.60 a month
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and a Sergeant earned $40.80. Out of this amount 12 l/2<f was taken each
month to support the Soldiers' Home. Lieutenant Wilson stated that his
monthly earnings were $116 3/4. Pay day was once every two months, the
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actual day being determined by the arrival of the Paymaster. The unit
musters held at the end of every month were, therefore, more a matter of
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accounting for personnel and reintroducing the soldiers to a little "spit
and polish" reminding them that they were still in the army.
Unit records of the Regiment, Battalion and Company do not reflect
any serious disciplinary problems in H Company. Private Hart told Corporal
Allport to "go to hell" on 31 January which cost him one month's pay. A
similar invitation to another N.C.O. at Fort Ethan Allen back in October
got Private Noeil five days' confinement at hard labor and a fine of $5.00.
One letter from Captain Dey to Major Gilmore exists mentioning an "attack"
by Private Cunniff against Lieutenant Wilson which was being addressed as
to possible disciplinary action. There is record of several cases of
dereliction on guard duty such as "slouching on post" and "sitting down
while on guard," but other than these, most of the other offenses found
related to minor infractions of the military code. The 1901 report of the
Inspector General of the Army states:
In the Philippines the commands are so
scattered and the officers so few in number
and burdened with innumerable duties that
the conditions are not favorable to a high
standard of discipline, and the reports
show a decided falling off in the observance
of regulations regarding dress, appearance,
and saluting. In other respects the disci-
pline is unquestioned. °
This statement, although dealing in general with America's Philippine army,
is true for Company H as well.
The Inspector General was very accurate in his remarks about the
soldiers' appearance and dress. The soldiers boarding the transport
Kilpatrick in May 1901 would look very different from those arriving in
Manila on the Meade almost a year and a half before. As early after
arrival on Luzon as 11 January, Colonel Murray published an order
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Company H. Soldiers break
for lunch on the trail
between Jaro and Carigara
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authorizing outposts to wear the blue flannel shirt, buttoned up, between
99
retreat and reveille. By February duty uniform was being described as
campaign hats, khaki trousers, tan shoes and leggins. Blue shirts were to
be worn buttoned up, sleeves down and no handkerchicves around the men's
necks. By April the uniform regulations were further relaxed to permit
men off duty to wear or not wear the canvas leggins "at the pleasure of the
wearer." One wonders whether the soldiers were following orders or if
orders regarding uniforms were attempting to keep abreast of the habits of
the soldier. Without going into more detail on the matter of uniforms,
since the accompanying photographs tell the story better than words, let it
only be pointed out that the officers and soldiers clad themselves as com-
fortably as possible within the limitations of army issue.
There were some problems with the personal equipment issued to the
troops. The brown russet shoes worn by the men were not up to the demands
of service in the Philippines. Commenting on the footwear problem, Colonel
Garlington, Inspector General in Manila, pointed out that, "for field ser-
vice, particularly in the mountains, the shoes are a failure; soles are too
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thin and soft, wear out rapidly, and are easily torn from uppers." Major
Allen, the Third Battalion commander, commented on the situation in an
official letter dated 6 April 1900, reporting that one patrol out for eleven
days returned without shoes because they wore out. Samar was a tough
proving ground for shoes. Another cause of foot trouble at Laguan was a
rash of ulcerated feet brought on by a lack of socks. Gilmore's battalion
had sent out several requisitions for a resupply, but between their depar-
ture from Manila in January and 18 May none had arrived.
Another item of issue which gave the soldier some cause for concern
was the blue flannel shirt, but not because of its discomfort in hot climate.
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The shirt had been in the army inventory since 1883. Apparently, the men
preferred it to the khaki blouse because of its lighter weight and the fact
that it was less restrictive to movement. What worried the army, said the
Inspector General's Department, was the dark blue color which acted as a
good aiming point for enemy riflemen. Experience from the Philippine
Insurrection would eventually lead to the development of a khaki flannel
shirt of the same design, but the Forty-third would not benefit from the
change as it came too late.
Another thing which came too late, at least as far as the soldiers
were concerned, was mail. The mail arrived at Laguan by steamer from Manila
via Calbayog or sometimes Tacloban, Leyte, about once or twice a month.
When a soldier did get mail it came in bunches. Lieutenant Wilson tells of
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receiving six at one time on 15 March. Pilferage of packages in the
postal system is mentioned in another letter written by Wilson who recommends
104
that anything of value be sent by registered mail.
Entertainment for the soldiers on Samar must have been very diffi-
cult to find. Prior to leaving Vermont, Mrs. Murray, the Colonel's wife,
collected reading matter from Essex Junction, Burlington and Winooski,
Vermont for the ocean trip. Because of this drive there must have been
considerable material available for the man who enjoyed reading. There is
not any evidence, either in official records or letters, that the soldiers
fraternized with the local females. But it is hardly likely that the
Americans did not avail themselves of the ladies' charms from time to time.
The lack of official references to these contacts is probably due to the
fact that, at least with Company H, no problems arose requiring disciplinary
action or investigation.
00
NCOs relaxing in Laguan, Samar
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On the other hand, drinking, sometimes to excess, is recorded in
both personal letters and official documents. This means of entertainment
is documented in reports of unit summary court procedures. Corporal Crozier
was fined and reduced to private for being drunk and disorderly in the
streets of Calbayog just two days following the company's landing in Samar.
The same man showed up at drill on 13 February in a similar condition.
Private Johnson of E Company who wandered off in early February after over-
indulging in some local vino was mentioned earlier. Alcoholic beverages
produced in the U.S. as well as locally made products were available to
members of the company. A problem situation regarding alcoholism is evi-
denced by a company directive published in Barugo, Leyte on 3 November 1900
forbidding the sale to soldiers of whiskey, vino, and tuba.
Officers of the company engaged in more refined kinds of entertain-
ment. The larger towns of Leyte and Samar such as the company's posts at
Laguan and later at Barugo normally contained families of Europeans work-
ing for commercial interests such as Warner, Barnes and Co. Frequently the
officers would be invited to their homes and treated with old world
courtesy. Even with the officers responding to their hospitality by sub-
jecting them to renditions of "After the Ball," the hosts and hostesses
seemed to genuinely enjoy these social occasions as much as Captain Dey and
his subordinates.
But times of frivolity were rare especially on Samar where the
company was virtually fighting for its life in the spring of 1900. Besides
the continual patrolling, or "hikes" as they were often referred to by both
officers and men, and the fatigue details already addressed, there were
other routine duties. Guard duty was the major garrison duty for all ranks,
68
the men as sentinels, the NCOs as NCOs of the guard, and officers as offi-
cers of the day. Even in a hostile environment there is hardly anything
that matches sentry duty for true boredom. A two hour tour of guard duty
is an eternity. It is lonely and it is dull. A brief summary of Summary
Court reports between the time the company embarked on board the Meade on
14 December until the company departed for Laguan on 20 February include
eight instances of misconduct on guard. This includes one involving
Private Slack who, while he was on guard on 5 December 1899, "Suffered
Private Weiss to enter hospital where a contagious disease was confined."
Eight Summary courts, which were related to infractions of regulations
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while on guard, out of thirty constitute a significant percentage.
Being attacked by both the Filipinos and U.S. Army Regulations proved to
be very uncomfortable to the guard. The officer, at least, was able to do
more than just walk his post in a military manner, keeping always on the
alert. He could find distraction in such pursuits as checking roll-call
at assembly for company parade, taking the names of late-comers, inspecting
company meals and inspecting the men's and officers' sinks and garbage
1 08
dumps twice daily. Little wonder that few men complained when selected
for a patrol
.
This, then, was what the men of Company H experienced in the
Philippines. They were exposed to many hardships caused by severe weather
and unsanitary conditions. The equipment issued was deficient in many
respects but, generally speaking, it was both functional and well suited
to the guerrilla war fought on Samar and Leyte. Recreational activities
lacked variety but these men lived at a time when pleasures were relatively
simple. Medical facilities were rudimentary by today's standards, but in
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comparison to earlier American wars were both plentiful and effective. And
finally, the rations consumed by the men of Company H were not especially
imaginative and supply of them somewhat irregular but sufficient to main-
tain the men's strength and ability to conduct combat operations for a year
and a half. With this in mind, a return to the odyssey of H Company Forty-
third Infantry, U.S.V. is in order.
PART III
The Forty-third Consolidates on Leytc
May and June were months of constant patrolling in the north coast
and the island of Laguan. The only real event of this period was the arri-
val on 13 June of the U.S. gunboat Marietta . After anchoring in the harbor
the next morning at 7 o'clock, the ship's captain and several of his offi-
cers paid a call on Captains Dey and Cooke. Later that day the two volun-
teer captains went aboard the navy vessel after which it sailed to a
position off the beaches of Catarman where it lobbed some shells into
insurgent trenches. The Marietta returned to Laguan the following afternoon
and disembarked Dey and Cooke who had just witnessed a pleasant way of
109fighting a war. The gunboat departed for Cebu the 16th. At 5:30 p.m.
26 June a steam launch from the U.S.A.T. Pennsylvania , which was laying off
the Laguan point, arrived with Major Allen and some other officers. Allen
had orders for Dey and Cooke to prepare their companies for departure at
once. Both units embarked and the Pennsylvania left for Calbayog the
following day. Company H transferred to the steamer Elcano at Calbayog
with the Second Battalion and were landed on the north coast of Leyte at
the town of Barugo on 2 July 1900, relieving a detachment commanded by
Lieutenant Morris of Company I.
This move was ordered by Brigadier General R. P. Hughes, past
Provost Marshal of Manila and recently assigned commander of the Department
of the Visayas. The decision was made due in great part to the beating
taken by Company H at Catubig. Hughes had concluded that the Forty- third
had bitten off more than it could chew in attempting pacification of both
70
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Samar and Leyte, which constituted the 1st District of the Department of
the Visayas . lie, therefore, ordered concentration of the Regiment on
Leyte, and Samar was transferred temporarily to the Department of Southern
112
Luzon as its 4th District. Samar was garrisoned after the Second and
Third Battalions' departure by six companies of the Twenty -ninth Infantry
Regiment, U.S.V. which went into a strict defensive attitude at Catbalogan
113
and Laguan. With the arrival of the last unit from Samar the U.S. force
in the 1st District totalled twelve companies of the Forty-third and
Companies A and D of the Forty-fourth Regiments of Infantry, U.S.V. , all
114
under command of Colonel Murray at Tacloban.
Murray organized Leyte into three Subdistricts, each under one of
his Majors. Andrews, who had been on Leyte the entire time, commanded the
First Subdistrict while Allen and Gilmore were placed in charge of the
Second and Third respectively. Later in December when Lincoln Andrews was
evacuated from the Philippine Islands for medical reasons, Allen became
commander of the First and Second Subdistricts which comprised the eastern
half of Leyte. The battalion organization was totally disrupted by this
set up, with Company H coming under Andrews' First Subdistrict. Even more
damaging to unit integrity was the assignment of officers of one company to
another such as the temporary assignment of Lieutenant Wilson and the more
permanent assignment of Joseph Sweeney to Company B. Although Captain Dey
and the company remained stationed at Barugo until the Regiment's departure
for the United States in the summer of 1901, there was a constant flow of
company members from one company station to another. This situation compli-
cates the study of Company H activities on Leyte.
73
The Situation in Lcyte in July 1900
When Murray arrived in Leyte in January, the Americans had to drive
General Moxica's insurgent troops out of Tacloban after a skirmish in the
streets. In the year that Leyte 's insurrecto leader had to prepare for
the arrival of the Americans, he had organized his forces into three infantry
companies, an artillery company, one section each of bolomen, flying
guerrillas and marine infantry and a superior headquarters. A captured
muster roll dated 1 January 1900 showed the command's strength as twenty
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nine officers and 467 men. The figures of this organization are mis-
leading since, subsequent to publication of the muster roll, the regular
officers were authorized to raise bolero companies greatly increasing its
size and fighting capacity.
On 2 March 1900 Moxica received instructions in a letter from the
Aguinaldo government which are interesting in that it describes techniques
to be used against the Americans and some revealing perceptions held by the
insurgents about their enemy. Guerrillas were told to fight the Americans
from a standing position as they fired low and it is better to be hit in
the leg than through the trunk or head. The poorly trained soldier shoots
high, the properly instructed soldier aims low to take advantage of rico-
chets. Maximum ranges of forty to fifty meters were encouraged for use
when engaging the enemy with rifles. Men were to recover weapons and ammu-
nition from friendly casualties but leave the wounded where they fell, an
indicator that men were easier to replace than rifles. Bolomen were to be
used to attack unarmed U.S. soldiers. Natives would be placed in occupied
towns to be "friends" but to spy on the Americans. And, in general, the
insurgent command on Leyte was to adopt guerrilla tactics. In addition,
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Filipino women should be used as couriers since the Americans never search
women. Finally, the instructions regarding friendly wounded were based on
the contention by the Filipinos that the U.S. soldiers take good care of
wounded insurgents.
Moxica's subordinates, as in most guerrilla conflicts, expended as
much effort attacking their fellow Visayans as they did the Americans. The
term used for their "home grown" enemies was "Americanistas. " On 20 May
1900 a letter was published over the signature of Ambrocio Moxica y Rodrins,
Brigadier General, Chief of Operations and Politico-Military Governor of the
Province of Leyte, listing military crimes. One of the crimes was the
entering of Filipinos into enemy service. That list does not show mandatory
penalties but in another letter dated 17 August Hones to Ruiz, commander of
the Second Company, reports to Moxica that he ordered "all real American-
119istas" such as police and volunteers put to death. The record, in fact,
120
shows that these measures were put into effect.
The Leyte guerrilla that fought the Americans was as savage a com-
batant as was his brother on Samar. Instances of badly wounded bolomen
aggressively attacking soldiers of the Forty-third are recorded in official
121
reports. However, whether it was the pressure applied by an entire U.S.
regiment reinforced with two additional companies, ineptness of the insur-
gent leadership or the lack of local support, the guerrilla war in Leyte
somehow never took on the deadly fierceness of that on Samar. There would
be no "Catubigs" on the Island of Leyte.
Company H on Leyte, 2 July 1900 to 22 May 1901
After their arrival at Barugo the company took up quarters in the
police station on the street called Calle San Francisco del California. The
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Barugo Street Scene.
Officers' quarters seen on the left side of the
street across from the troop barracks
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men set up their barracks upstairs and the officers, including Doctor Leeper,
on the ground floor. The building was of wood with a nipa thatched roof.
The officers would move to other quarters just across the street from the
122troops in a nipa building in November or December. But once set up the
company had work to do; there was still a guerrilla war being fought on the
island.
A patrol of fifteen men was sent to Carigara and back on 4 and 5
July. About the same time another patrol of twelve men under Sergeant Francis
was dispatched to provide protection for Lieutenant Wallace and his men who
were repairing a break in the telegraph wire.
First Lieutenant Charles S. Wallace, a signal corps officer, was
Murray's signal officer for the island. The signal corps lieutenant per-
formed yeoman service on Leyte in establishing wire communications and then
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constantly repairing it as the lines became favorite targets of the enemy.
To assist him, he had the support of about 23 NCOs and men from Company H,
Signal Corps, U.S.A. who also specialized in performing miracles, emplacing
poles, digging the holes with bayonets sometimes, stringing the wire and
then attempting to maintain the system. On 1 July 1900 three garrisons
were connected by wire. A year later eighteen garrisons had either telephone
or telegraphic communications or both. On 10 July 1900, Barugo's signal
station, equipped with a telephone, was opened. Many of the problems which
developed in Samar could have been overcome or alleviated had there been
such a system in existence there.
In the field of civil affairs, Captain Dey was blessed with a
functioning municipal government at Barugo. Besides the town council, with
Vedastro Adrales as Alcalde, there existed a police force of at least twenty
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men. Initially the police went unarmed except when loaned soldiers' weapons
which was a bad solution to the problem. Captain Dey remedied the situation
on 28 September by issuing .45 caliber revolvers to the native police as
124
replacements for their bolos.
Captain Dey was quick to seize upon the idea of using the town
constables in anti -insurgent operations. By 9 July, it is recorded, some
native police accompanied a patrol led by Sergeant James Francis which was
125
to check a report of the murder of an old man. Following this time it is
difficult to find any operation that was not accompanied by native police or
later by Filipino scouts. The concept of joint American-Filipino anti-
guerrilla forays was mutually beneficial to both sides. Not only did it
offer the Americans reliable guides who spoke the language and knew the
local people, but it gave the native police added prestige and an oppor-
tunity to learn military skills which would prove useful in law enforcement.
The work with local police was to lead to the formation of four companies
of Leyte Scouts, a concept found very successful on Luzon with the Macabebe
Scouts.
Doctor Leeper established a hospital which provided medical and
health services for both soldiers and civilians at Barugo. Because of his
treatment of the local population Leeper asked in July that the company
requisition certain medicines in lieu of bandages which were evidently
127
plentiful. Of course, the hospital at Barugo, which serviced the entire
north coast of Leyte, was not primarily there as a civil affairs project.
In spite of the sanitation measures taken by the company officers and NCOs
there were always sick men. A host of illnesses from diarrhea to smallpox
was to strike Barugo in the year it was occupied by Company H. Leeper and
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his two hospital corps men reacted with vigor to the smallpox epidemic which
developed in the town in January 1901. The surgeon got Captain Dey to
publish Special Order i>2 on 17 January listing protective measures to be
taken by the soldiers. Directives included personal sanitary actions and
prohibitions against entering or loitering around native "shack" houses or
stores. Failure to comply with this order resulted in immediate confine-
ment plus the preferring of charges of disobedience of orders against the
malefactor. And then in March 1901, after several days of feeling ill,
Leeper's assistant hospital steward died of what was later discovered to
be a self-inflicted overdose of morphine. Apparently, the easy access to
the drug in the hospital led Clare Trumbull to become addicted and then,
129probably by mistake, to overdose himself. He was buried in the Barugo
church cemetery joining five other soldiers from Companies L and B.
Schools were another area of nation building in which the company
became active. In Barugo there were established a school for boys and a
girls 1 school. The four teachers working in the schools were paid by the
army. Whether or not any of the officers or men of the company actually
taught the school children could not be ascertained from records available
except for one of Lieutenant Wilson's letters in which he states that
Sergeant Doe when in captivity on Samar taught school for the children of
130
the insurgents. Captain Dey, however, did help out by procuring teaching
materials for the schools from Mr. Atkinson, the General Superintendent of
Education in Manila. Supplies such as Barnes History of the United States
(in Spanish), Baldwin's First Year and Second Year English Readers
,
McGuffey's English Reading charts, Barnes Vertical Writing Copy Books
,
pens,
pencils, paper, slates and so forth were listed as being available in
81
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Manila for requisition. In a letter from Dey to Atkinson dated 16 Decem-
ber, the captain mentions the receipt of some items but gross shortages of
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others. Some may question the apporpriateness of U.S. histories and
English language materials. That the Philippines was now a territory of
the United States would appear to answer that query. The Americans found
that the school children were apt pupils and learned rapidly. By January
1901, Major Allen reported that 500 boys and girls were attending classes
133in Barugo with 300 more awaiting space. Although the officers and men
did find themselves involved in civil affairs their main purpose in the
Philippine Islands was to secure them, and that meant military operations.
As was pointed out earlier, the dispatching of patrols was begun
only two days after the company's arrival at Barugo. The west coast, in
Major Gilmore's sub-district proved to be the major area of guerrilla
activity. That area was mountainous and heavily forested and, therefore,
conducive to irregular warfare. Insurgent bands also operated in the First
Sub-District and these involved Company H. The normal method used was the
patrol of the kind which would be called "search and destroy" by the U.S.
army in the 1960's. Typical of these operations was one under the leader-
ship of Lieutenant Wilson which began 18 January. Taking six H Company men
plus fifteen Leyte scouts, of whom more will be written later, he set out
for Jaro. At midday a break was called and, after security was posted, the
men dug into their haversacks for a feast of salmon, which the soldiers
labeled "goldfish," and bread. The dusty men plodded into Jaro, a thirteen
mile march, at about 2 o'clock that afternoon. After dismissing the men,
Wilson indulged himself by pouring a few buckets of water down his back.
Before departing Jaro at 3 the next afternoon he picked up five recruits
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for his company of scouts. Two hours from Jaro the patrol arrived in
Alangalang along with a party of troops under Lieutenant Lindscy who had
joined forces at the former town. Eleven more recruits were taken on at
Alangalang, bringing the strength of Wilson's Second Company of Leyte Scouts
up to eighty-seven. At 7 a.m. on 21 January they set out for Palo, thirteen
miles distant. About half way to that town, near a place called Sante Fe,
a man was sighted cutting down one of Lieutenant Wallace's telegraph poles.
The man was swiftly dispatched. After a stop-over in Palo the patrol
continued up the coast to Tacloban, the headquarters of Regiment and the
First District of the Department of the Visayas. Reporting the arrival of
his men to the Regiment's adjutant, Captain Tilton, Wilson was informed that
he and his troops were quarantined along with everyone else at Tacloban.
A native had developed a case of smallpox prior to their arrival. While in
Tacloban, the lieutenant had a chance to observe one of the army's anti-
guerrilla policies being put into effect. On 29 January seventy-five
captured insurgent leaders, officers and civil officials, were put aboard
ships for deportation to Guam and other ports, accompanied by much sobbing
and wailing amongst their relatives who had come to witness their exile.
The patrol's period of confinement ended on 7 February and the patrol
marched an uneventful forty-two miles back to Barugo arriving there on the
9th. As noted, this "hike" was typical of the patrolling in the northeastern
subdistrict of Leyte. One and a half months earlier an operation in this
part of the island was undertaken by Lieutenants Swann and Leaf with thirty
men from Companies A, K and L, four native police from Tanauan and nine
prisoners which ended quite differently.
Six days after their departure from Tanauan they were skillfully
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ambushed on the beach near the village of Sabong between Babatungon and
Barugo by a band of insurgents led by Captain Domingo Umbria. Two men from
L Company were killed instantly in the murderous crossfire. Five others
went down with wounds of varying seriousness, including Second Lieutenant
Leaf. The fight lasted about thirty minutes. For the next six and a half
hours Swann struggled to get his wounded the last eight miles to Barugo.
The wounded were eventually transported to the H Company post in a makeshift
catamaran. Because of the communications system which had been established
on Leyte, word of the ambush was rapidly disseminated. The notification
brought Doctor Shattuck in from Jaro along with Captain Dey, and Major
(Doctor) Combe the surgeon from Tacloban in to assist Leeper with the
wounded. That night, under the flickering lamps of the hospital, the
doctors struggled to save the five wounded. Private Higgins died that
night from Remington bullets through the chest and side. Private Carr
succumbed from a Remington round in the back two days later on 16 December.
Louis H. Leaf whose right leg had been shattered from a bullet was saved
134
only by an amputation above the knee.
For the next week the territory in the area of the ambush was swept
by patrols. Captain Dey sent Wilson out with ten Americans and ten scouts
on 16 December. Lieutenant Morris, Allen's adjutant, brought twenty-nine
soldiers from Palo to Barugo on the 16th and departed two days later for
San Miguel in search of the insurgent band. A detachment from Alangalang
led by Lieutenant Lindsey patrolled through the abandoned San Miguel to
Babatugon reaching that town on 16 December with twenty-two Americans from
Companies B, F and H, and two native soldiers. Shortly after he got there
Lindsey met Captain Dey who came from Barugo aboard the steamer San
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Bernardino with Lieutenant Swann and some troops from Companies H and L.
Since Swann strongly suspected that the officials of that town had a hand
in the ambush of his force, Captain Dey arrested them and brought them back
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to Barugo on his return. Although the area was thoroughly searched,
very little was found. Umbria and his men had fled.
The Americans must have felt a deep sense of disappointment in being
unable to exact retribution from the guerrillas. Little did they know,
however, that this was to be the last major encounter with the insurgents on
the north coast of Leyte. From this time on the area became too hot for any
sizeable guerrilla force to operate. Besides the saturation patrolling of
infantrymen which kept the enemy on the move, the Forty-third employed two
more options in which Company H became involved.
The first of these variations began with the introduction of forty
American horses and forty sets of cavalry equipment into Leyte in July 1900.
Colonel Murray determined that two detachments of mounted infantry would be
formed. One detachment would be organized at Dagami, the second at Jaro in
the First Subdistrict. Second Lieutenant Charles C. Estes became the first
detachment commander at Jaro. On 15 December Lieutenant Sweeney who had
been on duty with Company B as post commissary assumed command of this
mounted infantry detachment. The stated purpose of these organizations was
for them to perform scouting activities and similar work. The mounted
soldiers soon became the kings of the road since they could respond rapidly
to reports of enemy activity in the area. Once on the scene of action the
men could dismount and perform their mission as infantrymen if the ground
proved unsuited to mounted movement. With Jaro situated in a central
position relative to the road network in the First Subdistrict, Sweeney's
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detachment was well placed to perform tasks of scouting and frequent escort
duty between towns. Between Sweeney's assumption of command and 8 May,
1 -is
five months, the horse soldiers fought in eleven recorded actions.
The second option has already been mentioned briefly. The formation
of the Leyte Scouts resulted from the success of similar native units on
other islands. Official organization of native scouts began in 19 July 1900
137in the Department of the Visayas. Regiment published General Order No. 4
on 17 August 1900 authorizing the raising of a Native Company to be
recruited from the towns of Barugo, Carigara, Jaro and Palo. This was the
second such company raised in Leyte and its headquarters would be at Barugo.
The unit was to consist of a first sergeant, five sergeants, twelve cor-
porals and eighty two privates and placed under command of Lieutenant
Wilson. Commanders of the previously named towns were responsible for
recruitment and initial training of the men. The scouts were issued Ameri-
can uniforms and equipment. During the early stage of the company's exis-
tence the troops drew the old Springfield rifles. Krags were not given to
1 ^8
the Second Company of Leyte Scouts until 9 April 1901. The scouts were
paid in Mexican coin beginning at $15 (Mexican) per month with another $3
139for clothing.
On 1 September Wilson enlisted his first twenty-six men. He
selected Manuel Ponferrada, who had been a thrice-decorated soldier in the
Spanish army, as the company's first sergeant. Two other sergeants and two
corporals were also designated in this original group. Two hours were
spent each day on training which included "school of the soldier, firing
manual and extended order." Since Wilson later discovered the men to be
140
brave but poor marksmen he began to conduct target practice twice weekly.
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The original concept in the use of the scouts was to have them
accompany every American patrol. As with the native police this proved to
benefit both the American and the Filipino soldiers. As early as 12
September the Leyte Scouts were participating in operations, the first
being with First Sergeant Graham to Tanga. On this outing a group of
insurgents was encountered and put to flight leaving behind one killed and
two wounded. From this date onward the scouts were constantly active in
the field. To ensure that a proper rapport was built between the two races
of soldiers, Murray directed that "Every effort will be made to promote
good feeling and cordial relations between American troops and native
141
troops." By the time the Forty- third left Leyte there would be a batta-
lion of four companies of Leyte Scouts.
The War Winds Down on Leyte
It was previously stated that the major enemy activities were
occurring on the west coast of Leyte during this time frame. Gilmore had
five companies of troops from the Forty-third and Forty-fourth Regiments
operating in his Third Subdistrict. Although there were insurgent attacks
in the First and Second Subdistricts most were more akin to banditry than
military activity. Moxica attempted to keep the fight up but he was to
142prove himself to be no Lukban. Leyte 's guerrilla leader was also having
difficulties controlling his subordinates. Jorge and Catilino Capili
controlled two guerrilla units that never seemed to be under Moxica's
command. Jorge Capili had gained a bad reputation as a bully and murderer
143
after an incident in August 1900. This lack of rigid structure is both
the strength and weakness of the guerrilla army.
89
Colonel Murray commenced his concerted effort to drive Moxica into
surrender once he had consolidated his positions on Leyte. Major Allen
captured one of Moxica's headquarters on the Upper Marabon River in August.
On 18 September Captain John L. Ketcham caught a party of insurgents in an
ambush, killing Francisco Flordeliz, Moxica's second in command, near
Hilongas on the west coast. Large bodies of guerrillas were scattered at
Dolores and Valencia in September and November respectively. On 9 April
Major Gilmore overran Moxica's cuartel at Caridad, capturing some cannon
and incriminating documents. By 1 April the insurgent leader was kept on
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the move by the incessant pressure.
In the meantime, while Murray's offensive was going on, General
Funston captured Emilio Aguinaldo on 23 March in a classic raid in Luzon's
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Benguet Mountains. At about the same time surrenders of major insurgent
units started on Leyte. The first to be recorded was the capitulation of
Commandante Leon Brillo with forty-four officers and men at Tacloban on
8 March. The next day Moxica wrote a letter in reply to one he had received
earlier from Major Gilmore. In his letter he stated that he would not
surrender until ordered to do so by the chief of the Filipino army. Until
that time his forces, he said, would fight on until the Americans gave up
the idea of retaining the archepelago. On 12 March a major indicator of
the fast approaching collapse of insurrecto resistance occurred. On that
day Captain Gregorio Almadrones with forty-six bolomen turned themselves in
to Colonel Murray at Tacloban. With them they brought the image of "Santo
Nino," a significant religious relic worshipped by the Catholics of Leyte.
The symbol was removed from Tacloban in January 1900 when the Americans
landed and was taken into the mountains. With the return of Tacloban 's
90
special patron, the people of the island realized the major fighting was
ending.
Among the other factors contributing to the changing mood of the
people was the presence on Leyte of representatives of the Filipino Federal
Party. This political group was formed in late 1900 by a group of promi-
nent Filipinos who, if not especially enamored with the idea, at least
accepted annexation of the Philippine Islands by the U.S. SeYior Agustin
Banez, the party's representative sent to Leyte, travelled around the
island speaking to villagers and insurgents, updating them on the current
situation in the rest of the archepelago. Colonel Murray gave Banez much
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of the credit for modifying the native sentiment toward the Americans.
Another indication pointing to the end of the Regiment's combat
mission was General Order No. 12, which was published by the Headquarters
of the First District in March. Colonel Murray, anticipating the return of
his regiment to the U.S., was evidently well aware that its military
appearance had declined somewhat since the arrival in Manila. The order
directed the company commanders to emphasize drills and ceremonies in
training so that when it was assembled it could present "a military appear-
148
ance commensurate with its field record." Murray had no intention of
having his men disembark at San Francisco with the appearance of jungle
bandits
.
Finally on 8 or 9 May Moxica received his orders from General Trias
on Luzon instructing him to surrender his command to the Americans. On the
evening of 18 May the insurgent General arrived at Baybay, escorted by
Captain Fair and capitulated to Major Gilmore. The following day, a Sunday,
he took the oath of allegiance after the morning church service. With this
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ceremony the insurgency on Leyte was, in effect, ended. There were several
bands still out such as those of the notorious Jorge and Catilino Capili
which would continue sporadic attacks for a time, but they could be dealt
with without much trouble. And, on 3 August, Lukban published a proclama-
tion reassigning command of the island, which exhorted the people to fight
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on. Few people on Leyte paid any attention to the proclamation, however.
By 26 May forty-seven officers and 1,368 men had turned themselves in and
had taken the oath.
The time for the Forty-third's departure for the United States was
rapidly approaching. It was a period for tying up loose ends. Personnel
changes were being made, property needed to be accounted for, and plans for
relinquishing various commands needed to be thought out.
Some of the officers and men would be remaining in the Philippines.
Major Henry T. Allen was appointed by the Philippine Commission to be the
Governor of Leyte on 22 April. Four of the Regiment's NCOs would be taking
command of the companies of scouts. Lieutenant Wilson was relieved of his
duties as commander of Company B, Leyte Scouts by Sergeant Noah Overly from
Company F on 18 May. Corporals Gantt and Corkum of Company H had applied
for positions with the metropolitan police force of Manila and had been
accepted. Their orders were received in February but they were not dis-
charged to assume these jobs until 23 March. Corporal Kennedy, Cook
Connors, Musician Sweeney and Private Percival all submitted their requests
for discharge in order to engage in business in the Philippines. They too
would be remaining when the Forty-third left.
On 22 May the U.S.A.T. Kilpatrick arrived off Carigara where Com-
panies B and H had been assembled. Lieutenant Wilson and a detachment had
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been left at Barugo until they could be relieved. As the Regulars
disembarked the men of the two volunteer companies loaded on board. From
Carigara the ship sailed down the west coast relieving and discharging
152
troops, then up the east coast and into Tacloban's harbor on 29 May.
Captain Dey's last monthly report was dated 26 May and notes street improve-
ments in Barugo, new sidewalks of coral, drainage ditches, progress of the
civil government, good attendance at the schools and a bridge on the road
153
to Tanga being completed. Regimental headquarters and the other detach-
ments which had been left behind initially embarked on 31 May 1901. The
forces relieving the twelve companies of the Forty-third and two of the
Forty-fourth consisted of six companies of the Eleventh U.S. Infantry and
two from the First U.S. Infantry. General R. P. Hughes, Commander of
the Department of the Visayas sent a letter to Murray on 16 May commending
his Regiments' service.
We feel in parting with the Forty-third
Infantry that we are losing one of the
brightest ornaments we have. It is hoped
that our countrymen on the other side of
the globe may eventually learn about and
have a veritable appreciation of the
valuable services your command has rendered
to our Government in the Philippines . 155
The Forty-third Makes Its Exit
After departing Tacloban on 1 June the Kilpatrick made its way to
Manila where it anchored until the 5th. At noon that day the vessel sailed
for San Francisco with 37 officers and 1,000 men from the Forty-third on
board. Of course, there was yet another list of calls published for
observance during the voyage across the Pacific. The day was scheduled to
start at 5:30 a.m. and end at 9:30 p.m. Mess hours were staggered and
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troops were fed from two mess halls. To ensure that the vessel was kept
in a sanitary condition Lieutenant Sweeney was appointed as assistant to
the police officer along with officers from other companies.
Lieutenant Wilson writes of the trip that it was "a most lovely
trip, calm, fast and pleasant for us all." He also remarked that there was
15 8
plenty of work to keep their "minds and hands from getting rusty." This
pleasant cruise ended on 27 June as the Ki lpatrick glided into San Francisco
Bay. The Regiment was moved to the Presidio at San Francisco and quartered
in a tent camp called "Model Camp." Here the Regiment would remain for the
last nine days of its short existence. On 5 July 1901 the Forty-third
Regiment of Infantry U.S. Volunteers became a part of history.
PART IV
The Volunteer Army at War
.... i
What can be deduced from this brief study of a U.S. volunteer
company at the dawn of the twentieth century? Using Company H as a vehicle,
there are several areas in which conclusions can be reached. Volunteer
units can be recruited. The men can respond effectively to training in a
short period of time. They can be placed in a very strange environment and
become accustomed to the terrain and enemy tactics. Disciplinary problems
do not appear to be excessive in these formations. And finally the men of
this company proved their fortitude on numerous occasions and also appeared
to react with great flexibility to the introduction of new concepts such
as civic action and the training and employment of indigenous soldiers.
The recruiting process is probably the key to the organization of
military units, both good and bad. Only a fool truly believes that
society's outcasts can be turned into effective soldiers any more than they
can be turned into good parking lot attendants or policemen. Sending
officers out from the unit to recruit their own men was fortuitous for
Company H. By no means was the recruiting one hundred per cent successful.
For instance, the company had eight deserters before it sailed from
Brooklyn. In addition, it had its share of minor disciplinary problems.
However, it is hard to believe that better recruiters could be found to
select men for their units than the Regiments' company officers. The
experience of Lieutenant Wilson while recruiting in Maine indicates the
care with which recruits were selected.
96
97
The men who volunteered in Company H had little time to train.
There is no evidence that indicates that any of the men other than the
officers and a few NCOs had any prior service. The amount of time the
company had in which to receive fruitful military instruction was at a
maximum of six weeks. In spite of the time deficiency, the men arrived in
the Philippine Islands in good physical condition and pretty well able to
hit targets at which they aimed. Besides the combat training it is also
apparent from the relatively low rate of incapacitating illnesses, although
there were some cases, that the men's training in hygiene and disease
control was properly grasped.
The evidence of low sick rates also shows that these men could
adapt to unaccustomed environments. One must recall that on their depar-
ture from Vermont the temperature gauges were at freezing, and upon the
arrival of the Meade at Manila the weather was sultry. Their marches north
of Manila reflect their physical ability to adapt. The battles on the
jungle trails proved their mental adaptability to be capable of fighting in
the hell of Samar. Only one man in the company, Corporal Goves, became
mentally unbalanced and had to be evacuated to the U.S.
In general, the troops had few disciplinary problems. Private
Keough appears to have had a gargantuan drinking problem as did Private
Crozier, but these men seem to be the exception to the rule. When regular
officers think about volunteer units their greatest area for concern is
lack of discipline, but a study of this company fails to support this
perception. Judged against the author's eighteen years of experience as
an infantry officer, the company appears to be a relatively well behaved
group of soldiers.
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More important than the attribute of discipline in a soldier is his
braveiy on the battlefield. A number of examples have been presented here
to prove the point of steadfastness in adversity. Catubig was a battle
lost. However, there were no Americans taken prisoner. In fact, there is
no evidence that any of the soldiers seriously considered throwing in their
hands. Wilson's ambush near Napora in February 1900 where his men fought
with drill field precision against hidden riflemen reinforces the fact.
Guts and discipline are not the only characteristics of reliable soldiers.
The ability to think is occasionally called upon. This aptitude was sorely
tested on Leyte and Samar. Soldiers were forced to use their skills in
nation building activities in numerous occasions, especially on Leyte where
the situation permitted it. Roads were built, bridges constructed, irriga-
tion canals dug and municipal sanitation improved. The successful experi-
ments of Leyte with the detachments of native scouts showed that these
American soldiers could work effectively with soldiers from a completely
different cultural background.
When taken together, the above factors prove that volunteer units
are capable of accomplishing complex military missions. The proper mixture
of conditions is required, however. America was still in its innocence and
held to a different set of values. A work ethic existed at that time which
has weakened considerably in the past seventy years. Therefore, the volun-
teers did not join to get something for nothing, and their attitude in the
Philippines demonstrated this. They were willing to strain if the job
required it. Also, the system of recruiting by units eliminated a large
percentage of hard-core bums that appeared before the recruiter's desk.
In conclusion it should be said that Company H, Forty-third Regiment
of Infantry U.S. Volunteers was no elite unit. It had its weaknesses. But
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Barugo
Soldiers of Company H and, on the right of
the formation, Leyte Scouts, prior to a
patrol led by Lieutenant Wilson
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it performed its job in the Philippines. Captain John R. M. Taylor in his
compilation of Insurgent records states it concisely:
They were neither monsters nor saints; they
were good examples of their time and period,
young men taken from the world of young men.
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Special Notes on the Maps Used
Samar: The map is a composition of data from three sources and has been
further modified by eliminating many of the villages which existed
at the time but are not made mention of in the text of this paper.
Robert S. Hendry (ed.), Atlas of the Philippines
,
maps 39 and 40;
U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Atlas of the Philippine Islands
,
Maps 18 and 19; John H. Evens, 1st Lt. 43d Inf. U.S.V., Topo-
graphical Officer, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding
the Army, pt. 5, Report of the War Department 1900 , facing p. 56.
Leyte: The map was a similar mixture of maps using the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey atlas plus: Col. Vincent J. Esposito, The West
Point Atlas of American Wars, Vol. II, map 145.
Special Notes on Photographs Used
Except for those photographs noted, all those used in this paper
are from the collection of papers left by Major General William Henry
Wilson, USA.
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Shortly before the United States Army celebrated its two hundredth
birthday in 1975, a change was made in its method of personnel procurement.
Beginning with America's entrance into World War I in 1917, the army had
been dependent upon a system of conscription to fill its wartime ranks.
The drafting of men into the armed forces was ended on 1 July 1973; the
Army had gone "all-volunteer." For those associated with the army the
years since have been ones of negative reaction in the ranks of the company
grade officers and noncommissioned officers. These are the people who have
to deal on a daily basis with the enlisted service member and they were
worried. Many of the volunteers who served in Vietnam and Germany proved
to be a disgrace to their uniform and country. To those involved in the
disciplinary system in Vietnam, it was plain that the problem children were
usually those with an RA serial number, an enlistee, not with the US prefix,
the draftee. Therefore, with the advent of the all-volunteer army it is
not surprising that prophets of doom abounded.
When was the last conflict of major proportions which was fought
with volunteers entirely? Possibly the Mexican punitive Expedition in
1916. But then that was not really a major conflict since it lasted less
than a year and employed primarily the existing small Regular Army as a
maneuver force.
About seventeen years prior to the punitive expedition, a conflict
began in a land seven thousand miles from the U.S. which eventually involved
126,468 American soldiers and lasted for three years. It was a savage con-
flict which began on the night of 4 February 1899 as a skirmish between
patrols of the American and Filipino Insurgent forces outside of Manila in
the Philippine Islands. The war was initially conducted as open warfare-
using sizeable organized military units. By November 1899 the leader of
the insurgents, Fmilio Aguinaldo, proclaimed a guerrilla war. It was a
dirty war fought in the damp jungle mountains and dense grasslands. Little
quarter was asked for or given on either side. It was a war fought by the
U.S. army entirely with volunteer soldiers, both regulars and men of the
so-called state and U.S. volunteer organizations.
In this thesis the author has selected a volunteer company, speci-
fically Company H, Forty- third Regiment of Infantry, U.S. Volunteers.
Aside from reasons of personal interest, this unit contained a good cross
section of American men because of the variety of localities from which men
were recruited. In addition the company soldiered on two islands in the
Visayas, Samar and Leyte, under command of their Regimental officers only,
with little or no interference from higher headquarters, providing a most
unusual laboratory in which to study.
The company was organized at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont on 8 October
1899 and underwent training until 13 November. On that day the Regiment
entrained for Brooklyn for an ocean voyage to the Philippine Islands via
the Suez Canal. After their arrival in Manila on 1 January 1900, the
Regiment remained for only a short period before receiving orders to take
part in General Kobbe's hemp port expedition in mid January. Company H as
part of the Second Battalion landed at Calbayog, Samar on 26 January and
was blooded in the mountains and river valleys of the island. Heavy losses
were sustained by a detachment of the company at Catubig in April and
another heroic fight occurred in the mountains near Matiginao in March 1900,
In both these battles and in others, the company showed it was capable of
executing its combat mission under grueling circumstances.
Later when the Regiment consolidated on the Island of Leyte after
July 1900, the company found itself engaged in the chore of nation building.
Instead of constantly fighting, the men were put to work helping the Fili-
pinos in civic actions such as health and medical assistance, road building
and establishing law and order for the security of the people. Some members
of the company were also tasked in the organization, training and leading
in combat of an indigenous armed force called the Leyte Scouts.
The study, using examples, proves that under the proper conditions
volunteer soldiers and units are more than capable of filling the role of
combat units. To find the examples for the thesis, government records at
the National Archives were studied as well as the Annual Reports of the War
Department and House and Senate documents. To add to a feel for the environ-
ment in which all this happened, Taylor's Compilation of Captured Insurgent
Documents proved to be something that no student of the Philippine Insurrec-
tion could ignore. And finally newspaper articles, private correspondence,
especially those of Lieutenant William Henry Wilson, in the author's personal
collection, and of Major Henry T. Allen,kept at the Library of Congress,
provide the flesh covering the skeleton of official documents.
